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[I]t is difficult to overstate the strong federal policy in favor of
arbitration . . . .
—Arciniaga v. General Motors Corp.1

The Second Circuit erred when it claimed difficulty in overstating the
federal policy favoring arbitration. Courts overstate this policy regularly,
often with disastrous consequences for consumers, workers, and the bodies
of law designed to protect their interests.
Arbitration clauses have become ubiquitous. Arbitration clauses require
consumers and employees to waive their rights to bring litigation in court,
leaving private arbitration as their only avenue to seek redress for violations
of any law, including consumer protection laws, antitrust law, and antidiscrimination laws. The arbitration process is less protective of consumers
and employees in many ways than the litigation process in public courts. Yet
for consumers in many markets, arbitration clauses are unavoidable because
firms impose contracts of adhesion that include mandatory arbitration
clauses, which require individuals to waive their rights to sue in court.
As the Supreme Court has expanded the categories of legal claims that
are subject to mandatory arbitration, firms have begun to load their
mandatory arbitration clauses with unconscionable contract terms. This is
arbitration bootstrapping. Arbitration bootstrapping describes situations
where firms insert terms unrelated to arbitration into an arbitration clause in
the hopes that judges will be more likely to enforce terms embedded in
arbitration clauses. For example, firms insert terms into their arbitration
clauses to shorten statutes of limitations, to reduce damages, or to prevent
injunctive relief.2 These contract terms are considered unconscionable—and,
thus, unenforceable—in many states. However, the Supreme Court has
interpreted the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 (the FAA)3 to require
deference to arbitration clauses; consequently, many courts allow firms to
bootstrap unenforceable contract terms into an arbitration clause in order to
make unconscionable contract terms enforceable.
In theory, legal doctrines exist to protect consumers and workers from
arbitration clauses that are unconscionable or that eliminate an individual’s
ability to seek redress for violations of the law. Most notably, state contract
law makes unconscionable contracts—and unconscionable contract terms—

1. 460 F.3d 231, 234 (2d Cir. 2006).
2. See infra section I(C)(2).
3. The original 1925 law was called the United States Arbitration Act, but Congress changed
the name to the Federal Arbitration Act in 1947 without amending the substance of the Act. To
avoid any confusion, this Article follows the accepted convention of referring to the law as the
Federal Arbitration Act or FAA at all times.
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unenforceable.4 With respect to federal statutory rights, the Effective
Vindication Doctrine provides that the “arbitration of the claim will not be
compelled if the prospective litigant cannot effectively vindicate his statutory
rights in the arbitral forum.”5
The Supreme Court, however, has recently undermined both of these
mechanisms—the unconscionability defense and the Effective Vindication
Doctrine—in cases involving class action waivers in arbitration clauses. A
class action waiver is a contract term that requires consumers and workers to
promise neither to bring nor to participate in class action litigation against the
firm.6 By eliminating the possibility of class actions, firms can essentially
immunize themselves from judicial scrutiny because the cost of bringing an
individual action often exceeds the maximum potential damage award.7
Despite this, in 2011, in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,8 the Supreme
Court held that the FAA preempted state laws that treated certain class action
waivers embedded in arbitration clauses as unconscionable.9 The ruling
meant that firms could evade otherwise applicable state laws against an
unconscionable class action waiver simply by inserting the waiver into an
arbitration clause. In 2013, the Supreme Court in American Express Co. v.
Italian Colors Restaurant10 considered a Second Circuit opinion that struck
down a class action waiver for violating the Effective Vindication Doctrine

4. Because contract law is state law, the unconscionability doctrine is a function of state law
and varies across states. Unconscionability has two aspects: substantive and procedural. Substantive unconscionability refers to the actual terms of the contract, such as price, obligation, waiver of
rights, or consequences of breach. Procedural unconscionability focuses on the process by which
the contract is made, including such issues as whether the parties had equal bargaining power and
whether the contract is a contract of adhesion.Most states require a combination of substantive
unconscionability and procedural unconscionability before declaring a contract or a contractual term
unconscionable. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1746 (2011)
(stating that under California law unconscionability requires both a procedural and a substantive
element). However, under certain circumstances, some states allow a finding of unconscionability
based on substantive unconscionability alone. See, e.g., Maxwell v. Fid. Fin. Servs., Inc., 907 P.2d
51, 59 (Ariz. 1995) (concluding that under Arizona’s adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code a
claim of unconscionability can be established by showing substantive unconscionability alone). In
the context of arbitration clauses, the procedural unconscionability is often established because the
contract is adhesive. See, e.g., Gatton v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d 344, 355 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2007) (noting that there is inherent inequality of bargaining power associated with contracts
of adhesion). Individual terms within the arbitration agreement can be considered substantively
unconscionable, as discussed in infra section I(C)(2).If a court determines that a contract—or
contract term—is unconscionable, it can invalidate the entire contract, strike the unconscionable
term, or reform the contract to avoid an unconscionable result. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 208 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
5. In re Cotton Yarn Antitrust Litig., 505 F.3d 274, 282 (4th Cir. 2007).
6. See infra section I(C)(1).
7. See infra notes 67–72 and accompanying text.
8. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
9. Id. at 1746, 1753; see infra notes 67–72 and accompanying text.
10. 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).
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because the cost of bringing an individual claim could exceed $1 million
while the maximum possible recovery was less than $40,000.11 The Supreme
Court reversed, holding that “a contractual waiver of class arbitration is
enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act when the plaintiff’s cost of
individually arbitrating a federal statutory claim exceeds the potential
recovery.”12 Consequently, the Italian Colors opinion substantially undermined the Effective Vindication Doctrine as a doctrine for protecting individuals from unfair mandatory arbitration clauses.13
In tandem, these two decisions operate to dismantle entire fields of law,
including laws against fraud, deception, predatory conduct, antitrust violations, and employment discrimination. Although Concepcion and Italian
Colors both involved class action waivers, this Article demonstrates how
firms are harnessing the reasoning of these opinions in order to insert a
variety of unconscionable contract terms into arbitration clauses. Based on
the so-called federal policy favoring arbitration, many courts feel compelled
to enforce these otherwise illegal contract terms so long as the terms reside
in a contract’s arbitration clause.
In the wake of Concepcion and Italian Colors, judges who have upheld
anti-consumer terms in arbitration clauses claim to be merely implementing
the will of Congress. Yet the senators and representatives who voted for the
Federal Arbitration Act would not recognize today’s arbitration clauses that
courts are enforcing in the name of the 1925 Congress. This Article explains
how enforcement of current arbitration clauses, both as to their reach and
their content, is inconsistent with the purpose and text of the Federal
Arbitration Act.
Part I examines how, six decades after the FAA’s enactment, the
Supreme Court claimed that Congress intended the FAA to cover federal
statutory rights, such as antitrust and employment discrimination claims.
This Part also explores how—after courts upheld the expanded reach of
arbitration clauses—companies more aggressively inserted anti-consumer
terms into their arbitration clauses. Firms now use arbitration clauses as a
bootstrap, a mechanism to impose contract terms that would otherwise be
unenforceable as a matter of contract law. For example, many state laws—
as well as the contract doctrine of unconscionability—condemn contract
provisions that purport to forbid class actions, truncate statutes of limitations,
limit damages, preclude injunctions, or manipulate fee shifting, among other
anti-consumer terms. While courts enforce these state laws in traditional
contracts cases, some judges have exhibited a willingness to defer to the same
terms when they are inserted into an arbitration provision. This provides a

11. Id. at 2308.
12. Id. at 2307.
13. Mark A. Lemley & Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust Arbitration and Merger Approval, 110
NW. U. L. REV. 1, 4 (2015).
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strong incentive for retailers and employers to use arbitration clauses as a
vehicle for imposing anti-consumer terms that would otherwise be
unenforceable.
Part II explains how the Supreme Court has invoked the legislative
intent of the 1925 Congress in order to justify opinions that apply the FAA
to all claims, including federal statutory claims and consumer-initiated
lawsuits. Courts have further suggested that Congress intended arbitration
clauses to be enforced as written, which provides a justification for deference
to anti-consumer terms that would be found unconscionable under state law.
Finally, the Supreme Court has asserted that the FAA preempts all state
efforts to police arbitration clauses, including basic notification requirements.
Part III examines the actual legislative history of the Federal Arbitration
Act. It explains that Congress was exclusively concerned with the
enforceability of arbitration agreements between sophisticated businesses in
commercial disputes. Congress never considered the possibility that retailers
would impose mandatory arbitration clauses on their customers, let alone that
these arbitration clauses would be structured to limit damages, to truncate
statutes of limitations, or to otherwise remove procedural protections from
consumers. The congressional intent that courts employ to enforce anticonsumer terms in arbitration clauses is an imagined one. Exploring the
legislative history of the FAA shows that the 1925 Congress would not
recognize the FAA that today’s courts claim to be honoring.
Part IV argues that courts should stop asserting that the FAA mandates
deference to—let alone strict enforcement of—contract terms as long as the
terms are buried in an arbitration clause. When confronting unconscionable
terms in arbitration clauses, courts can take one of three actions: enforce the
unconscionable terms, sever the unconscionable terms, or strike the arbitration clause as a whole because it is so permeated by unconscionable terms.
This Part explains why only the latter two options are consistent with
Congressional intent and good public policy.
I.

The Three Expansions of Arbitration Clauses

A.

The Expanding Number of Arbitration Clauses

Well before the Supreme Court’s decision in Concepcion, American
businesses imposed arbitration clauses on their customers and employees.14
14. Sarah Rudolph Cole, On Babies and Bathwater: The Arbitration Fairness Act and the
Supreme Court’s Recent Arbitration Jurisprudence, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 457, 499–503 (2011);
Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey P. Miller & Emily Sherwin, Arbitration’s Summer Soldiers: An
Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 871, 882–85 (2008); Amy J. Schmitz, Legislating in the Light: Considering Empirical
Data in Crafting Arbitration Reforms, 15 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 115, 116 (2010).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2775437

LESLIE.TOPRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

270

11/25/2015 1:59 PM

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 94:265

The Court’s recent endorsements of arbitration clauses have seemingly
spurred more firms to adopt this tactic.15 Mandatory arbitration clauses have
come to dominate entire industries, such as cell phone service, credit cards,
and cable service.16 For example, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
(CFPB) arbitration study found that “[s]even of the eight largest facilitiesbased mobile wireless providers (87.5%), covering 99.9% of subscribers,
used arbitration clauses in their 2014 customer agreements.”17 Professor Jean
Sternlight notes that arbitration clauses are common when consumers
“purchase or rent certain products (e.g., computers, items bought through
Amazon or Zappos, Starbucks gift cards, or rental equipment), enroll in
schools, rent movies, or purchase auto parts.”18 Brokerage firms have made
pre-dispute arbitration clauses standard in their account agreements with
customers.19 Similarly, over 98% of licensed storefront payday operations
impose arbitration clauses on their borrowers.20
Arbitration clauses are increasingly found in both consumer and
employment contracts because firms insert the clauses into contracts of
adhesion. Buyers are unable to preserve their right to sue in court because
firms refuse to sell goods or services unless such rights are relinquished.21
Similarly, many workers—indeed, all workers in some industries—must
waive their right to litigate violations of employment law, including illegal

15. Myriam Gilles & Anthony Sebok, Crowd-Classing Individual Arbitrations in a Post-Class
Action Era, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 447, 459–60 (2014) (“And it is a fair bet that the number of
companies relying on arbitration clauses has spiked since the Court’s 2011 decision in Concepcion,
where the majority lauded AT&T’s arbitration clause as being fundamentally fairer and better for
consumers than litigation.”).
16. Homa v. Am. Express Co., 494 Fed. App’x 191, 197 (3d Cir. 2012); CONSUMER FIN. PROT.
BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY: REPORT TO CONGRESS PURSUANT TO DODD-FRANK WALL
STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT § 1028(a), § 1.4.1, at 10 (2015) [hereinafter
CFPB ARBITRATION STUDY] (“In the private student loan and mobile wireless markets, we found
that substantially all of the large companies used arbitration clauses.”); id. § 1.4.1, at 9 (“Tens of
millions of consumers use consumer financial products or services that are subject to pre-dispute
arbitration clauses.”).
17. CFPB ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 16, § 2.3, at 7.
18. Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration Clauses Prevent Consumers from
Presenting Procedurally Difficult Claims, 42 SW. L. REV. 87, 95 (2012) (footnotes omitted).
19. Jill I. Gross, AT&T Mobility and the Future of Small Claims Arbitration, 42 SW. L. REV.
47, 48 n.6 (2012).
20. CFPB ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 16, § 2.3.4, at 22; see also id. § 2.3, at 7 (“Six of
the seven private student loan contracts in our sample (85.7%) from 2014 included arbitration
clauses . . . .”).
21. Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking the Deck of
Justice, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Oct. 31, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/business/
dealbook/arbitration-everywhere-stacking-the-deck-of-justice.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/9M7LADBP] (“Over the last few years, it has become increasingly difficult to apply for a credit card, use
a cellphone, get cable or Internet service, or shop online without agreeing to private arbitration. The
same applies to getting a job, renting a car or placing a relative in a nursing home.”).
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discrimination.22 These contracts of adhesion change the calculus of
contracting because the weaker party has no voice in the contents of the
contract, including in the terms within the arbitration clause. Many, if not
most, consumers and workers are largely unaware that they are signing away
their rights to court access.23 And the Supreme Court has forbidden states
from requiring firms to provide upfront notice of arbitration clauses.24
The imposition of arbitration clauses will likely increase in the coming
years. Those arbitration clauses that pre-dated Concepcion are changing to
include anti-consumer provisions such as class action waivers.25 The Court’s
decisions in Concepcion and Italian Colors have signaled a judicial
willingness to enforce all manner of arbitration clauses, even if the clause
includes provisions that would violate state law or make effective vindication
of one’s rights impossible.
B.

The Expanding Reach of Arbitration Clauses

Courts initially limited arbitration to use for resolving commercial disputes between merchants.26 Businesses, however, realized that by inserting
arbitration clauses into their consumer contracts, they could prevent their
customers from suing them in court for alleged violations of the law. The
federal courts initially resisted these attempts to subject individuals to
mandatory arbitration.27
For decades, federal courts precluded pre-dispute arbitration clauses
from covering federal statutory claims. For example, in the context of federal
securities law, the Supreme Court in 1953’s Wilko v. Swan28 invalidated
22. See, e.g., Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 1998)
(noting that “employers . . . require as a mandatory condition of employment . . . [as a] broker-dealer
in the securities industry—that all employees waive their right to bring Title VII and other statutory
and non-statutory claims in court and instead agree in advance to submit all employment-related
disputes to binding arbitration”), overruled by EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 345
F.3d 742, 745 (9th Cir. 2003).
23. See Lemley & Leslie, supra note 13, at 44–45 (arguing that arbitration clauses are often
imposed on unaware consumers and that as a result consumers are forced to give up the right to sue
in federal court).
24. See infra note 202 and accompanying text.
25. Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion Impedes Access to
Justice, 90 OR. L. REV. 703, 718 (2012) (“In the near future, we can expect that even more
companies will impose arbitral class action waivers as a means to insulate themselves from class
actions because Concepcion has changed the calculus.”).
26. Andrea Doneff, Is Green Tree v. Randolph Still Good Law? How the Supreme Court’s
Emphasis on Contract Language in Arbitration Clauses Will Impact the Use of Public Policy to
Allow Parties to Vindicate Their Rights, 39 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 63, 69 (2012) (“For a number of
years after the FAA’s passage, the Supreme Court was careful to make a distinction between
consumer/individual arbitration and business-to-business arbitration.”).
27. Id. at 68–69.
28. 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490
U.S. 477, 485 (1989).
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mandatory arbitration agreements, reasoning that Congress “enacted the
Securities Act to protect the rights of investors and has forbidden a waiver of
any of those rights.”29 Acknowledging that while arbitration may work for
inter-merchant contractual disputes, the Court concluded, “the intention of
Congress concerning the sale of securities is better carried out by holding
invalid such an agreement for arbitration of issues arising under the
[Securities] Act.”30
Applying the Wilko reasoning to antitrust law, the federal circuits
uniformly held that antitrust claims were non-arbitrable. Most notably, in
1968, the Second Circuit concluded in American Safety Equipment Corp. v.
J.P. Maguire & Co.31 that pre-dispute arbitration agreements did not apply to
antitrust litigation.32 The court reasoned that subjecting antitrust claims to
private arbitration would reduce plaintiffs’ incentives to investigate and
pursue antitrust actions, result in antitrust cases being decided by arbitrators
who may be unqualified to understand complex antitrust issues or too biased
to reach fair outcomes, and conflict with the congressional intent that federal
judges decide and apply antitrust law.33 For two decades, all circuits that
considered the issue followed American Safety and held that antitrust claims
were non-arbitrable.34
Similarly, courts had long held that the FAA did not apply to
employment contracts or claims of employment discrimination.35 Title VII
protects “equality of employment opportunities by eliminating those
practices and devices that discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.”36 Although government officials enforce Title VII,
the Supreme Court has recognized that “the private right of action remains
an essential means of obtaining judicial enforcement of Title VII.”37 More
importantly, the Supreme Court in 1974’s Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
Co.38 held that employees could not prospectively waive their right to litigate
Title VII claims by signing employment contracts with arbitration clauses.39

29. Id. at 438.
30. Id.
31. 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968).
32. Id. at 827–28.
33. Id. at 826–28.
34. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 620–21 (1985)
(highlighting the uniformity of the circuit courts).
35. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 40 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(citing cases); Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 466 (1957) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) (“[W]hen Congress passed legislation to enable arbitration agreements to be enforced
by the federal courts, it saw fit to exclude this remedy with respect to labor contracts.”).
36. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974).
37. Id. at 45.
38. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
39. Id. at 52, 59–60.
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The Court explained that “[a]rbitral procedures, while well suited to the
resolution of contractual disputes, make arbitration a comparatively
inappropriate forum for the final resolution of rights created by Title VII.”40
In particular, the Court noted that the arbitral process was less capable of
protecting workers’ rights, in part because “[t]he record of the arbitration
proceedings is not as complete; the usual rules of evidence do not apply; and
rights and procedures common to civil trials, such as discovery, compulsory
process, cross-examination, and testimony under oath, are often severely
limited or unavailable.”41 Ultimately, the Court concluded that “the
informality of arbitral procedure” that works well for commercial disputes
“makes arbitration a less appropriate forum for final resolution of Title VII
issues than the federal courts.”42
After decades of holding that arbitration clauses did not apply to federal
statutory claims, the Supreme Court changed course in the 1980s. The Court
acted incrementally, first holding that some federal securities fraud claims
could be decided in private arbitration.43 The Court then held that antitrust
claims could be arbitrated in international fora,44 which the lower courts
expanded to all domestic antitrust claims as well.45 Building on its prior
securities and antitrust opinions, the Court next held that arbitration clauses
could cover civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization (RICO)
claims, reasoning the court’s “duty to enforce arbitration agreements is not
diminished when a party bound by an agreement raises a claim founded on
statutory rights.”46 The Court then reasoned that all private federal securities
claims could be arbitrated, reversing its holding in Wilko.47
Invoking all of its prior extensions of the FAA to federal statutory
claims, the Court in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.48 held that
employees could not bring individual claims of employment discrimination
that violated federal law in federal court if the employee’s securities
registration application included an arbitration clause.49 One commentator
characterized Gilmer as “a surprising reversal of [the Court’s] prior refusal

40. Id. at 56.
41. Id. at 57–58.
42. Id. at 58.
43. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 215, 223–24 (1985).
44. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 635 (1985).
45. See Lemley & Leslie, supra note 13, at 8 n.27 (collecting cases).
46. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226, 242 (1987) (“The Arbitration
Act, standing alone, therefore mandates enforcement of agreements to arbitrate statutory claims.”).
47. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 483–85 (1989).
48. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
49. Id. at 25 n.2, 26, 28 (“The Sherman Act, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, RICO, and
the Securities Act of 1933 all are designed to advance important public policies, but, as noted above,
claims under those statutes are appropriate for arbitration.”).
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to require arbitration of statutorily protected individual rights.”50 After
Gilmer, federal employment discrimination claims—whether brought
pursuant to Title VII, the Americans with Disabilities Act, or other statutory
regimes—were covered by arbitration clauses.51 The Court has similarly
required enforcement of arbitration clauses in the context of state
employment discrimination claims brought in state court despite the fact that
the FAA explicitly exempts employment contracts from the Act’s reach.52
In short, despite the absence of new evidence, the Court disavowed the
reasoning of all its prior opinions that had explained the deficiencies of the
arbitration process and the inability of consumers and workers to protect their
statutory rights through arbitration. Instead, the Court invoked a newly
created Congressional intent to make all federal claims arbitrable.53
C.

The Expanding Content of Arbitration Clauses

The expansion of mandatory arbitration to cover consumer and
employment contracts, and all causes of action that may arise from them,
fundamentally undermines the expansive body of state and federal law
designed to protect consumer and worker interests. Scholars have explained
how arbitration as a process of resolving consumer conflicts unfairly favors
business defendants.54 For example, arbitration substantially limits discovery.55 Consumers need more discovery than the firms that they are suing.56
Similarly, plaintiff employees in employment disputes generally require
more discovery to establish their claims than defendant employers need to
defend themselves.57 In addition to these procedural aspects of arbitration

50. Doneff, supra note 26, at 75.
51. See, e.g., Austin v. Owens–Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875, 885–86 (4th Cir.
1996) (holding that the disposal of Title VII and Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) claims
through summary judgment was correct because the plaintiff failed to submit her claims to
mandatory arbitration as required in a collective bargaining agreement).
52. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 109 (2001) (confining the FAA
employment exemption to transportation workers); infra notes 300–13 and accompanying text.
53. See infra notes 300–13 and accompanying text.
54. See, e.g., Richard A. Nagareda, The Litigation-Arbitration Dichotomy Meets the Class
Action, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1069, 1093 (2011) (giving an example of this preferential
treatment, specifically that FAA jurisprudence gives contract drafters the power to draft rules
tantamount to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
55. See Lemley & Leslie, supra note 13, at 14–15.
56. Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court’s
Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 683–84 (1996).
57. See Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 683 (Cal. 2000) (“The
employees argue that employers typically have in their possession many of the documents relevant
for bringing an employment discrimination case, as well as having in their employ many of the
relevant witnesses. The denial of adequate discovery in arbitration proceedings leads to the de facto
frustration of the employee’s statutory rights.”). The court subsequently rejected this argument,
instead holding that consent to an arbitration agreement necessarily implies consent to adequate
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that undercut consumer and employee interests, many businesses specifically
structure their arbitration clauses to undermine or displace laws designed to
protect consumers and workers.
1. Class Action Waivers.—Class action litigation is often necessary for
the victims of business misconduct to secure any recovery for their injuries.58
Congress created the class action vehicle “to overcome the problem that
small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any individual to bring a
solo action prosecuting his or her rights.”59 Class action litigation spreads
litigation costs across a large number of plaintiffs, significantly reducing the
cost per litigant.60 The Supreme Court has recognized that “[w]here it is not
economically feasible to obtain relief within the traditional framework of a
multiplicity of small individual suits for damages, aggrieved persons may be
without any effective redress unless they may employ the class-action
device.”61 Without class actions, individuals may be unable to protect their
rights and to deter illegal conduct.62 Indeed, Professor Myriam Gilles has
argued that “class actions and aggregate litigation represent the law’s besteffort at procedural democracy, at providing access to courts for groups—
consumers, employees, small business owners—that would otherwise be
unable to have their claims openly adjudicated.”63
In recognition of the importance of class action litigation in holding
firms responsible for their illegal conduct, many firms have sought to
eliminate class actions by imposing class action waivers on their customers.

discovery for their claim—albeit not the full discovery available in court—but that this adequacy is
to be determined by the arbitrator and subject only to limited judicial review. Id. at 684.
58. McKenzie Check Advance of Fla., LLC v. Betts, 112 So. 3d 1176, 1184 (Fla. 2013)
(“[M]any potential claims may go unprosecuted unless they may be brought as a class.”) (quoting
Cruz v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, 648 F.3d 1205, 1212 (11th Cir. 2011)).
59. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit
Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997)).
60. See U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 402–03 (1980) (“The justifications
that led to the development of the class action include . . . the facilitation of the spreading of litigation
costs among numerous litigants with similar claims.”); Fiser v. Dell Comput. Corp., 188 P.3d 1215,
1219 (N.M. 2008) (“The class action device allows claimants with individually small claims the
opportunity for relief that would otherwise be economically infeasible because they may
collectively share the otherwise prohibitive costs of bringing and maintaining the claim.”).
61. Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980).
62. See Salvas v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 893 N.E.2d 1187, 1215 (Mass. 2008) (“Class actions
were designed not only to compensate victimized group members, but also to deter violations of the
law, especially when small individual claims are involved.” (quoting 2 ALBA CONTE & HERBERT
B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 4.36, at 314 (4th ed. 2002))); Geoffrey P. Miller,
Overlapping Class Actions, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 514, 514 (1996) (noting that the class action is an
“effective mechanism for privately enforcing the law, deterring wrongful conduct, and
compensating victims”).
63. Myriam Gilles, Procedure in Eclipse: Group-Based Adjudication in a Post-Concepcion
Era, 56 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1203, 1205 (2012).
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A class action waiver requires consumers to promise not to initiate or
participate in any class action against a firm.64 The popularity of class action
waivers increased in 1999
when the National Arbitration Forum (“NAF”), a for-profit arbitral
body designated in the arbitration provisions of many large companies,
disseminated marketing materials cautioning corporate attorneys that
the only way to insulate their clients from class action liability in
general . . . was to implement arbitration provisions containing terms
that expressly waive the right to class treatment.65
Class action waivers are now common boilerplate in many contracts.66
Class action waivers often render litigation prohibitively expensive for
plaintiffs because the expected costs of bringing an individual claim exceed
the highest possible damages award.67 Because of the economics of
individual action, frequently “the class action waiver effectively bars these
claims from being brought in any forum.”68 The New Mexico Supreme Court
has observed that “[b]y preventing customers with small claims from
attempting class relief and thereby circumscribing their only economically
efficient means for redress, [a] class action ban exculpates the company from
wrongdoing.”69 Similarly, the New Jersey Supreme Court has explained that
“[i]n addition to their impact on individual litigants, class-action waivers can
functionally exculpate wrongful conduct by reducing the possibility of
attracting competent counsel to advance the cause of action. Class-action

64. The language of class action waivers is not always clear. See Gay v. Creditinform, 511 F.3d
369, 375 (3d Cir. 2007) (“Any claim arising out of or relating to the Product shall be settled by
binding arbitration in accordance with the commercial arbitration rules of the American Arbitration
Association on an individual basis not consolidated with any other claim.”); Provencher v. Dell,
Inc., 409 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1199 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (“The arbitration will be limited solely to the
dispute or controversy between Customer and Dell . . . .”).
65. Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the
Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 397 (2005).
66. See, e.g., Hopkins v. World Acceptance Corp., 798 F. Supp. 2d 1339, 1343 (N.D. Ga. 2011);
Clerk v. First Bank of Del., 735 F. Supp. 2d 170, 174 (E.D. Pa. 2010).
67. Muriithi v. Shuttle Express, Inc., 712 F.3d 173, 178 (4th Cir. 2013) (“[I]f ‘class actions are
prohibited by the [Franchise Agreement], the realistic alternative would be that no individual suits
are brought given that the costs of each individual arbitration has the potential to exceed any
recovery.’” (alteration in original)); Muhammad v. Cty. Bank of Rehoboth Beach, 912 A.2d 88, 99
(N.J. 2006) (“In most cases that involve a small amount of damages, ‘rational’ consumers may
decline to pursue individual consumer-fraud lawsuits because it may not be worth the time spent
prosecuting the suit, even if competent counsel was willing to take the case.”).
68. Gilles, supra note 63, at 1224; see also, e.g., Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP, 768 F.
Supp. 2d 547, 552 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (explaining that without a class action the plaintiff “would be
required to spend approximately $200,000 in order to recover double her overtime loss of
approximately $1,867.02,” and that “[o]nly a ‘lunatic or a fanatic’ would undertake such an
endeavor”), rev’d and remanded, 726 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2013).
69. Fiser v. Dell Comput. Corp., 188 P.3d 1215, 1221 (N.M. 2008) (“On these facts, enforcing
the class action ban would be tantamount to allowing Defendant to unilaterally exempt itself from
New Mexico consumer protection laws.”).
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waivers prevent an aggregate recovery that can serve as a source of
contingency fees for potential attorneys.”70 Consequently, class action
waivers ultimately allow firms to insulate themselves from all liability and
even scrutiny.71 Firms have used class action waivers to prevent plaintiffs
from pursuing a wide range of legal claims.72
Recognizing the danger posed by class action waivers, many state courts
had invalidated them.73 Courts had used primarily two methods to do so.
First, some courts held that class action waivers could be held unconscionable.74 Most notably, the California Supreme Court created the Discover
Bank75 rule, which held that class action waivers “in a contract of adhesion,
at least to the extent they operate to insulate a party from liability that
otherwise would be imposed under California law, are generally uncon-

70. Muhammad, 912 A.2d at 100.
71. Dale v. Comcast Corp., 498 F.3d 1216, 1224 (11th Cir. 2007) (“Corporations should not be
permitted to use class action waivers as a means to exculpate themselves from liability for smallvalue claims.”); Sternlight, supra note 25, at 725 (“If we allow companies to insulate themselves
from class actions, we are effectively allowing companies to escape many legal regulations and
thereby eliminating a great deterrent to company misconduct.”).
72. See, e.g., Anderson v. Comcast, Corp., 500 F.3d 66, 68 (1st Cir. 2007) (involving the
“Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act, . . . and various common law tort theories”); Hopkins v.
World Acceptance Corp., 798 F. Supp. 2d 1339, 1342 (N.D. Ga. 2011) (involving a “breach of
contract, unjust enrichment, conversion, violation of Georgia RICO, violation of Georgia’s
Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and violation of the Truth in Lending Act”).
73. See, e.g., Fiser, 188 P.3d at 1218 (“[T]he class action ban is contrary to fundamental New
Mexico public policy.”); Gentry v. Superior Court, 165 P.3d 556, 569 (Cal. 2007) (“The principle
that in the case of certain unwaivable statutory rights, class action waivers are forbidden when class
actions would be the most effective practical means of vindicating those rights is an arbitrationneutral rule: it applies to class waivers in arbitration and nonarbitration provisions alike.”),
abrogated by Iskanian v. CLS Transp. L.A., LLC, 327 P.3d 129 (Cal. 2014). Other state courts
have found class action waivers in arbitration clauses to be enforceable. See, e.g., Gay v.
Creditinform, 511 F.3d 369, 392 (3d Cir. 2007); Tsadilas v. Providian Nat’l Bank, 786 N.Y.S.2d
478, 480 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004); AutoNation USA Corp. v. Leroy, 105 S.W.3d 190, 199–201 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.). Courts in some states were split. Compare Schwartz
v. Alltel Corp., No. 86810, 2006 WL 2243649, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. June 29, 2006) (finding a class
action waiver established substantive unconscionability, regardless of arbitration context), with
Hawkins v. O’Brien, No. 22490, 2009 WL 50616, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2009) (finding a
class action waiver did not establish substantive unconscionability).
74. Szetela v. Discover Bank, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862, 867 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (“The manifest
one-sidedness of the no class action provision at issue here is blindingly obvious.”); Kinkel v.
Cingular Wireless LLC, 857 N.E.2d 250, 278 (Ill. 2006) (“In sum, we hold that under the
circumstances of this case, the waiver on class actions is unconscionable.”); Muhammad, 912 A.2d
at 100 (“We hold, therefore, that the presence of the class-arbitration waiver in Muhammad’s
consumer arbitration agreement renders that agreement unconscionable.”).
75. Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005), abrogated by AT&T Mobility
LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
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scionable.”76 Several courts followed suit,77 though many did not.78 Second,
some federal courts held class action waivers unenforceable under the
Effective Vindication Doctrine.79 This judicial hostility toward class action
waivers caused many companies to reform their arbitration clauses to make
them less aggressive.80
The calculus fundamentally changed in 2011, when the Supreme Court
in Concepcion overruled the Discover Bank rule. Concepcion prevented
lower courts from following those jurisdictions that had condemned certain
class action waivers in arbitration clauses as unconscionable.81 Professor
Maureen Weston has noted that “[a]fter Concepcion, a rubber-stamp effect
seemed to ensue in the courts addressing the enforceability of class action

76. Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1109 (Cal. 2005), abrogated by AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
77. See, e.g., Kinkel, 857 N.E.2d at 271 (“Our research reveals that other state courts have
invalidated class action waivers when the contract containing the waiver is burdened by other unfair
features, rendering it substantively unconscionable when taken as a whole.”); Feeney v. Dell Inc.,
989 N.E.2d 439, 441 (Mass. 2013) (“[W]e conclude that a court is not foreclosed from invalidating
an arbitration agreement that includes a class action waiver where a plaintiff can demonstrate that
he . . . effectively cannot pursue a claim against the defendant in individual arbitration according to
the terms of the agreement, thus rendering his . . . claim nonremediable.”), abrogated by Am.
Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013), as recognized in Machado v. System4
LLC, 993 N.E.2d 332, 333 (Mass. 2013); Gilles, supra note 63, at 1214 (“At first, courts were
skeptical of these unconscionability challenges leveled at the class action waivers, and the vast
majority of early decisions upheld the waivers against this challenge. The tide turned in 2005, when
the California Supreme Court decided . . . Discover Bank . . . .”).
78. E.g., Lipuma v. Am. Express Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1321 (S.D. Fla. 2005) (“Federal
courts have . . . not hesitated to enforce arbitration agreements that precluded class action relief.”);
In re Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust Litig., 361 F. Supp. 2d 237, 259–60 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(collecting cases); Rains v. Found. Health Sys. Life & Health, 23 P.3d 1249, 1253 (Colo. App.
2001) (“[A]rbitration clauses are not unenforceable simply because they might render a class action
unavailable.”); see also 1 JOSEPH M. MCLAUGHLIN, MCLAUGHLIN ON CLASS ACTIONS: LAW AND
PRACTICE § 2:14, at 97 n.30 (11th ed. 2014) (collecting cases).
79. In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig., 634 F.3d 187, 198–99 (2d Cir. 2011); Kristian v.
Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 29, 37, 50 (1st Cir. 2006); In re Elec. Books Antitrust Litig., No. 11
MD 2293, 2012 WL 2478462, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“Plaintiffs’ affidavits demonstrate that it
would be economically irrational for any plaintiff to pursue his or her claims through an individual
arbitration.”); see also Gillette v. First Premiere Bank, No. 3:13-CV-432, 2013 WL 3205827, at *4
(S.D. Cal. 2013) (noting split among courts); Lemley & Leslie, supra note 13, at 8–9.
80. See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The Unconscionability Game: Strategic Judging and the
Evolution of Federal Arbitration Law, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1420, 1458 n.141 (2008) (“[G]iven the
recent successes of unconscionability challenges, the most aggressive arbitration clauses are now
being scaled back.”); Myriam Gilles, Killing Them with Kindness: Examining “ConsumerFriendly” Arbitration Clauses After AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 825,
847 (2012) (“In other words, at the height of unconscionability’s success in beating back arbitration
clauses, companies responded by redrafting their provisions to make them less vulnerable to that
challenge.”).
81. Sternlight, supra note 25, at 708–09 (“As interpreted by most courts, Concepcion is
destroying virtually all possible attacks on arbitral class action waivers.”).
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waivers in arbitration agreements.”82 Even judges that recognize the folly of
the Concepcion opinion feel compelled to follow it, as one district judge
noted with regret: “There is no doubt that Concepcion was a serious blow to
consumer class actions and likely foreclosed the possibility of any recovery
for many wronged individuals.”83 Dozens of courts have since upheld class
action waivers in arbitration clauses.84
Firms responded to the Concepcion opinion by inserting class action
waivers into their arbitration clauses.85 Professor Gilles predicted that in the
aftermath of Concepcion,
class action waivers will soon seep into every contract—whether
signed, clicked, mass-emailed, posted on a website, or otherwise
“consented to”—until aggregate litigation itself becomes a procedural
relic examined only briefly in courses on the legal history of the
twentieth century, that long-ago era where legal claims were actually
adjudicated in public courts of law.86
Her prediction has proven prescient.87 These precluded claims include
“cases brought regarding consumer fraud, consumer debt, violations of
federal and state wage and hour legislation, and unpaid wages.”88
It is important to remember, however, that Concepcion is not an
endorsement of contractual class action waivers writ large; rather, the Court

82. Maureen A. Weston, The Death of Class Arbitration After Concepcion?, 60 U. KAN. L.
REV. 767, 782 (2012).
83. Bernal v. Burnett, 793 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1288 (D. Colo. 2011).
84. CHRISTINE HINES ET AL., PUB. CITIZEN & NAT’L ASS’N OF CONSUMER ADVOCATES,
JUSTICE DENIED: ONE YEAR LATER: THE HARMS TO CONSUMERS FROM THE SUPREME COURT’S
CONCEPCION DECISION ARE PLAINLY EVIDENT 4, app. at 32–34 (2012), http://www.citizen.org/
documents/concepcion-anniversary-justice-denied-report.pdf
[http://perma.cc/MDM7-YGLW]
(noting “76 potential class action cases where judges cited Concepcion and held that class action
bans within arbitration clauses were enforceable”).
85. Arbitration clauses also regularly forbid classwide arbitration. See CFPB ARBITRATION
STUDY, supra note 16 § 2.5.5, at 44–45 (“[I]n our samples, class arbitration was unavailable for
99.9% of arbitration-subject credit card loans outstanding, 97.1% of arbitration-subject insured
deposits, essentially 100.0% of arbitration-subject prepaid card loads, 98.2% of arbitration-subject
payday loan storefronts, and 99.7% of arbitration-subject mobile wireless subscribers.”); Theodore
Eisenberg et al., Arbitration’s Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in
Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 871, 884 (2008) (“[E]very
consumer contract with an arbitration clause also included a waiver of classwide arbitration.”).
86. Gilles, supra note 63 at 1208 (footnotes omitted); see also Gilles, supra note 80, at 853
(“[A]ll the clauses I examined contained class action waivers.”).
87. See, e.g., Jeremy B. Merrill, One-Third of Top Websites Restrict Customers’ Right to Sue,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/23/upshot/one-third-of-top-websites
-restrict-customers-right-to-sue.html?_r=1 [http://perma.cc/L3T3-JUBC] (noting doubling of class
action waivers); Ann Marie Tracey & Shelley McGill, Seeking a Rational Lawyer for Consumer
Claims After the Supreme Court Disconnects Consumers in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,
45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 435, 448 (2012) (noting that businesses quickly adapted online arbitration
clauses to block the possibility of collective redress in both judicial and arbitral forums).
88. Sternlight, supra note 25, at 709 (footnotes omitted).
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based its decision on deference to arbitration clauses. As a result, arbitration
agreements have become a safe harbor for otherwise unenforceable class
action waivers.89 Absent the judicial deference to the terms in arbitration
agreements, class action waivers would not be protected by Concepcion;90
the Discover Bank rule still invalidates class action waivers contained in
contracts without arbitration agreements.91 However, in those states that
make class action waivers unenforceable under certain circumstances,
would-be defendants can evade these state laws by inserting their class action
waivers into arbitration clauses.
After Concepcion—with the unconscionability defense no longer a
viable tool to invalidate class action waivers in arbitration clauses—some
courts turned to the Effective Vindication Doctrine to address the issue. The
Supreme Court created this arbitration-specific doctrine when it held that
federal statutory claims were subject to arbitration.92 While reversing the
American Safety rule that antitrust claims were non-arbitrable,93 the
Mitsubishi94 Court held that federal statutory claims could be arbitrated “so
long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate its statutory cause
of action in the arbitral forum.”95 Justice Kagan has explained the importance
of the Effective Vindication Doctrine:
The effective-vindication rule furthers the statute’s goals by ensuring
that arbitration remains a real, not faux, method of dispute resolution.
With the rule, companies have good reason to adopt arbitral procedures that facilitate efficient and accurate handling of complaints.
Without it, companies have every incentive to draft their agreements
to extract backdoor waivers of statutory rights, making arbitration
unavailable or pointless.96
The tension between the Effective Vindication Doctrine and class action
waivers is illustrated by class action litigation brought by a group of
89. Gilles & Sebok, supra note 15, at 459 (“Most recently, in American Express Co. v. Italian
Colors Restaurant, a 5–3 majority held that class action waivers embedded in arbitration clauses
are enforceable even where proving the violation of a federal statute in an individual arbitration
would prove too costly to pursue.”).
90. See Nancy A. Welsh, Mandatory Predispute Consumer Arbitration, Structural Bias, and
Incentivizing Procedural Safeguards, 42 SW. L. REV. 187, 192–93 (2012) (“[C]orporations and the
Court are merely making opportunistic use of arbitration and the FAA’s protective shield, to
camouflage the ‘troll’ of class waiver.”).
91. Jodi Wilson, How the Supreme Court Thwarted the Purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act,
63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 91, 112–13 (2012) (citing In re Yahoo! Litig., 251 F.R.D. 459, 465–67
(C.D. Cal. 2008)).
92. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637, 640 (1985).
93. See supra notes 31–34 and accompanying text.
94. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
95. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637.
96. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2315 (2013) (Kagan, J.,
dissenting).
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merchants against American Express. In Italian Colors, the merchants
alleged that American Express had violated antitrust laws and brought their
class action in federal court despite the fact that they had all signed contracts
with arbitration clauses that contained class action waivers.97 They argued
that they could not effectively vindicate their rights through individual
arbitration.98 The plaintiffs’ economist noted that the median-volume
merchant in the class could expect $5,252 in trebled damages, yet the out-ofpocket expenses for bringing an individual arbitration or lawsuit “just for the
expert economic study and services, would be at least several hundred
thousand dollars, and might exceed $1 million.”99 Even the largest volume
named plaintiff merchant could only achieve $38,549 in damages after
trebling, far less than the nonrecoverable costs necessary to retain the
required economic testimony.100 The Second Circuit agreed with the
merchants, concluding that “the only economically feasible means for
plaintiffs enforcing their statutory rights is via a class action.”101
The Supreme Court reversed.102 Conceding that the class action waivers
made individual arbitration prohibitively expensive, the majority asserted
that “a contractual waiver of class arbitration is enforceable under the Federal
Arbitration Act when the plaintiff’s cost of individually arbitrating a federal
statutory claim exceeds the potential recovery.”103 As a result of Italian
Colors, firms can use arbitration clauses to prevent class actions104 even when
participation in class action litigation is the only possible mechanism to
effectively vindicate one’s federal rights.105
The combination of Concepcion and Italian Colors makes it
exceedingly difficult for the victims of illegal conduct to challenge the
enforceability of class action waivers.106 This alone fundamentally undermines access to any adjudicatory forum. But the opinions also invite firms
to impose other questionable contract terms that courts may be unable to
declare unconscionable or unenforceable if found in an arbitration clause, as
the following section explains.

97. Id. at 2308 (majority opinion).
98. Id.
99. In re American Express Merchs.’ Litig., 667 F.3d 204, 217–18 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting
Dr. French’s affidavit), rev’d sub nom. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304
(2013).
100. Id. at 218.
101. Id.
102. Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2312.
103. Id. at 2307.
104. Id. at 2311.
105. Lemley & Leslie, supra note 13, at 12.
106. See Sternlight, supra note 25, at 798–09 (“As interpreted by most courts, Concepcion is
destroying virtually all possible attacks on arbitral class action waivers.”).
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2. Unconscionable and Unenforceable Terms in Arbitration Clauses.—
In addition to class action waivers, firms have regularly inserted other anticonsumer and anti-employee provisions in their contracts and arbitration
clauses, with varying degrees of success. Some of these terms are considered
unconscionable under the common law unconscionability doctrine while
others are prohibited by state statutes; in either case, some courts will not
enforce these terms. This section will discuss several types of these terms:
(1) truncated statutes of limitations, (2) damage limitations, (3) antiinjunction clauses, (4) fee-shifting provisions, (5) forum-selection clauses,
and (6) non-coordination agreements. Each of these provisions undermines
consumer protection and employment law. More importantly, these provisions would be contractually unenforceable in at least some jurisdictions but
for the fact that they reside in an arbitration clause.
a. Statutes of Limitations.—Statutes of limitations serve multiple
purposes. They protect defendants against unfair surprise and they preclude
fraudulent or stale claims.107 But limitations periods must be long enough to
afford victims of illegal conduct sufficient time to develop the facts necessary
to plead and prove their case; otherwise wrongdoers will not be held accountable and deterrence suffers.108 The Alaska Supreme Court has explained that
“[s]tatutes of limitations attempt to strike a balance between ensuring that
claimants have enough time to file a claim and protecting persons from due
process concerns that arise when subjected to stale charges.”109 The U.S.
Supreme Court has articulated this balance as “a value judgment concerning
the point at which the interests in favor of protecting valid claims are
outweighed by the interests in prohibiting the prosecution of stale ones.”110
Many consumer protection laws have relatively generous statutes of
limitations.111 And, in general, the law limits the ability of businesses to
contractually require their customers and employees to truncate the
applicable statute of limitations. Some states allow contracting parties to
reduce the prescribed statute of limitations,112 but parties may not agree to a

107. Christopher R. Leslie, Den of Inequity: The Case for Equitable Doctrines in Rule 10b-5
Cases, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 1587, 1590 (1993).
108. See id. at 1591 (discussing how if the “statute of limitations is too short, victims are less
likely to bring suit in time, wrongdoers are less likely to be held accountable, and deterrence of the
initial crime is diminished”).
109. Brotherton v. Brotherton, 142 P.3d 1187, 1191 n.19 (Alaska 2006).
110. Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 463–64 (1975).
111. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 15b (2012) (providing a four-year statute of limitations for antitrust
claims).
112. See, e.g., Sanders v. Comcast Cable Holdings, LLC, No. 3:07-CV-918-J-33HTS, 2008
WL 150479, at *12 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 14, 2008) (“[T]he class action waiver and truncated statute of
limitations do not render the Arbitration Notice substantively unconscionable.”); Blue Shield of Cal.
Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 120 Cal. Rptr. 3d 713, 720 n.11 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011)
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limitation period that is “unreasonably short.”113 Other states prohibit
altogether the shortening of statutes of limitations.114 For example, under
Florida law, “[a]ny provision in a contract fixing the period of time within
which an action arising out of the contract may be begun at a time less than
that provided by the applicable statute of limitations is void.”115 Some courts
have found contractual restrictions on limitations periods to be substantively
unconscionable.116 Even when speaking deferentially about parties’ ability

(noting “the well-established principle that the parties to a contract may agree to shorten or extend
the statute of limitations”); Wilson Fertilizer & Grain, Inc. v. ADM Milling Co., 654 N.E.2d 848,
853 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (“Indiana law specifically permits parties to a contract for sale to reduce
the time for filing claims to one year, and Wilson has not shown that the one-year limitation is not
within the customary limits of the trade.”); Nez v. Forney, 783 P.2d 471, 473 (N.M. 1989) (“[P]arties
can put their own statute of limitations period in a contract, and our courts will honor it.”).
113. Henning Nelson Const. Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Am. Life Ins. Co., 383 N.W.2d 645, 651
(Minn. 1986); see also Order of United Commercial Travelers of Am. v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586, 608
(1947) (“[I]t is well established that, in the absence of a controlling statute to the contrary, a
provision in a contract may validly limit, between the parties, the time for bringing an action on
such contract to a period less than that prescribed in the general statute of limitations, provided that
the shorter period itself shall be a reasonable period.”); Alexander v. Anthony Int’l, L.P., 341 F.3d
256, 266 (3d Cir. 2003) (“We recognize that a provision limiting the time to bring a claim or provide
notice of such a claim to the defendant is not necessarily unfair or otherwise unconscionable. But
such a time period must still be reasonable.”); Hambrecht & Quist Venture Partners v. Am. Med.
Int’l, Inc., 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 33, 43 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (“As for shortening the limitations period,
the courts will enforce the parties’ agreement provided it is reasonable.”); Kraly v. Vannewkirk,
635 N.E.2d 323, 329 (Ohio 1994) (“[A] provision in a contract of insurance which purports to
extinguish a claim for uninsured motorist coverage by establishing a limitations period which
expires before or shortly after the accrual of the right of action for such coverage is per se
unreasonable and violative of the public policy of the state of Ohio . . . .”); Bd. of Supervisors v.
Sampson, 369 S.E.2d 178, 180 (Va. 1988) (parties may alter a statute of limitations “if the
contractual provision is not against public policy and if the agreed time is not unreasonably short”);
Yakima Asphalt Paving Co. v. Wash. State Dep’t of Transp., 726 P.2d 1021, 1023 (Wash. Ct. App.
1986) (“Parties to a contract can agree to a shorter limitations period than that called for in a general
statute.”).
114. ALA. CODE § 6-2-15 (2015) (“Except as may be otherwise provided by the Uniform
Commercial Code, any agreement or stipulation, verbal or written, whereby the time for the
commencement of any action is limited to a time less than that prescribed by law for the
commencement of such action is void.”); In re Cotton Yarn Antitrust Litig., 505 F.3d 274, 287 n.8
(4th Cir. 2007) (noting that South Carolina law “prohibits contractual shortening of statutes of
limitation”); Honeywell, Inc. v. Ruby Tuesday, Inc., 43 F. Supp. 2d 1074, 1078 (D. Minn. 1999)
(describing shortening of statutes of limitations as “illegal per se”).
115. Palma Vista Condo. Ass’n of Hillsborough Cty., Inc. v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,
No. 8:09-CV-155-T-27EAJ, 2010 WL 4274747, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 7, 2010) (quoting FLA. STAT.
§ 95.03) (alteration in original).
116. Zaborowski v. MHN Gov’t Servs., Inc., 601 F. App’x 461, 463 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he
contract’s sixth-month limitations period is substantively unconscionable.”); see also Shahin v.
I.E.S. Inc., 988 N.E.2d 873, 875 (Mass. App. Ct. 2013) (“The limitations period set out in the
contract is one year from the date of the contract . . . . The limitations period thus expired one year
from the date of the contract—regardless of the date of any alleged breach or its discovery. . . . [I]t
is therefore invalid and unenforceable.”).
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to shorten statutes of limitations, courts sometimes override a contractual
statute of limitations.117
Many businesses attempt to circumvent these rules by including
shortened statutes of limitations in arbitration clauses. Attorneys advise their
clients (and other attorneys) to use arbitration clauses as a mechanism for
shortening the statute of limitations.118 Unlike judges, arbiters do not have to
apply the same considerations of reasonableness and have more latitude to
enforce business-imposed reductions of the statute of limitations.119
Although “reasonableness” limits the contractual ability to shorten statutes
of limitations, arbitrators may not honor these limits.120
b. Damage Limitations.—Many laws allow successful plaintiffs to
recover more than mere compensatory damages. Exemplary damages serve
many important purposes, such as “to punish reprehensible conduct and to
deter its future occurrence.”121 Some states—and some federal laws—limit
the ability of defendants to require their consumers and employees to waive
exemplary damages.122 For example, when a federal statute provides for
treble or punitive damages, parties cannot contractually waive them.123 When
a contractual limitation of damages conflicts with damages available
pursuant to a state law, courts often invalidate the contract provision.124
Independent of statutorily provided damages, courts also disallow damage
caps, as well as liquidated damage clauses that have the effect of fixing

117. Nez, 783 P.2d at 473.
118. See Edward J. Underhill, Statutes of Limitation and Arbitration: Limiting Your Client’s
Exposure, 101 ILL. B.J. 244, 244 (2013) (“Contrary to what many lawyers think, it’s not safe to
assume general statutes of limitation automatically apply to Illinois arbitration claims. That’s why
you should consider including a clause limiting your client’s exposure in your arbitration
agreements.”).
119. See Lemley & Leslie, supra note 13, at 17 (discussing that in the context of antitrust
disputes, which involve consumers suing dominant firms, selecting arbitrators from the business
community creates the possibility of weakened antitrust scrutiny of defendants).
120. See id. at 24 (arguing that in the “new world of arbitration, plaintiffs may be forced to
bring an underdeveloped case or risk losing their claims forever”).
121. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974).
122. See, e.g., Gessa v. Manor Care of Fla., Inc., 86 So. 3d 484, 493 (Fla. 2011) (“Thus, these
limitation of liability provisions, which place a $250,000 cap on noneconomic damages and waive
punitive damages, violate the public policy of the State of Florida and are unenforceable.”).
123. See, e.g., Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138, 154 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997)
(asserting that the right to punitive damages under Title VII “ha[s] never been deemed prospectively
waivable in the context of an employment dispute”).
124. See, e.g., Capital Equip., Inc. v. CNH Am., LLC, 471 F. Supp. 2d 951, 958 (E.D. Ark.
2006) (holding that a contractual limitation of damages provision is inapplicable to the extent that
such provisions limit the statutory protections afforded to the plaintiff under the state law).
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damages before breach.125 Courts have rejected attempts to enforce contract
provisions that claim to ban money damages altogether.126
In response to laws that allow plaintiffs to recover noncompensatory
damages, many firms use arbitration clauses to attempt to limit damages.
Arbitration clauses commonly prohibit punitive damages, incidental
damages, and any other type of damage beyond mere compensatory
damages.127 Some arbitration clauses also claim to cap damages irrespective
of actual damages.128 Finally, some clauses claim to strip arbiters of any
“authority to award any punitive or exemplary damages” or “extra
contractual damages of any kind.”129
While these terms may be unenforceable in a traditional contract
interpreted by a judge, an arbiter gets to determine whether the damagelimitation provision in an arbitration clause is enforceable.130 It is not clear

125. See, e.g., Gross v. McKenna, No. E2005-02488-COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL 3171155, at *5
(Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 30, 2007) (“[L]iquidated damages . . . clauses are unenforceable where the
actual damages caused by a breach are ‘readily susceptible to accurate proof . . . .’”); Commercial
Real Estate Inv., L.C. v. Comcast of Utah II, Inc., 285 P.3d 1193, 1202 (Utah 2012) (“[T]he court’s
underlying goal is to avoid enforcement of unconscionable liquidated damages clauses.”).
126. See, e.g., Health Net of Cal., Inc. v. Dep’t of Health Servs., 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 235, 249 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2003) (invalidating the clause insofar as it exculpated the defendants “from liability for
any money damages for statutory and regulatory violations”).
127. CFPB ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 16, § 2.5.6, at 47 (“Damages limitations in
prepaid card contracts with arbitration clauses were more frequent, and almost always precluded
recovery of both punitive and consequential damages.”); Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration and
Unconscionability After Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1001,
1025 (1996); see, e.g., Anderson v. Comcast, Corp., 500 F.3d 66, 68 (1st Cir. 2007) (explaining that
arbitration agreement prohibited attorney’s fees and double or treble damages); O’Quinn v. Comcast
Corp., No. 10 C 2491, 2010 WL 4932665, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 29, 2010) (“All parties also waive
claims to punitive damages unless provided for by statute.”); Gatton v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No.
SACV 03-130, 2003 WL 21530185, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2003) (“[N]o lost profits, punitive,
incidental or consequential damages, other than the prevailing party’s direct damages, may be
awarded . . . .”); Htay Htay Chin v. Advanced Fresh Concepts Franchise Corp., 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d
547, 555 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (“[T]he arbitration provision limits recovery to actual compensatory
damages and does not allow for noneconomic and punitive damages.”).
128. See, e.g., Crewe v. Rich Dad Educ., LLC, 884 F. Supp. 2d 60, 67–68 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)
(reviewing an arbitration agreement that limited the maximum amount the arbitrator can award to
“the amount paid by you to us under the Agreement plus the fees and costs provided for in this
paragraph”).
129. PacifiCare Health Sys., Inc. v. Book, 538 U.S. 401, 405 (2003); see also Captain Bounce,
Inc. v. Bus. Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 11-CV-858, 2012 WL 928412, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2012)
(“The arbitrator at such arbitration shall not be entitled to award punitive damages to any party, and
the costs and fees of such arbitration shall be borne by the losing party.”).
130. PacifiCare, 538 U.S. at 406–07 (“[S]ince we do not know how the arbitrator will construe
the remedial limitations, the questions whether they render the parties’ agreements unenforceable
and whether it is for courts or arbitrators to decide enforceability in the first instance are unusually
abstract. . . . [T]he proper course is to compel arbitration.”); Anderson, 500 F.3d at 72 (discussing
PacifiCare); In re Universal Serv. Fund Tel. Billing Practices Litig., 300 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 1127
(D. Kan. 2003) (“[T]he extent to which the limitation of liability on punitive or exemplary damages
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whether arbiters are bound to follow statutory damage rules.131 Furthermore,
some courts have held that “[a]rbitrators may award punitive damages only
where the parties have expressly agreed to the arbitrator’s authority to award
punitive damages.”132 Arbitration creates the possibility that arbiters will
enforce damage-limitation provisions that judges would invalidate.133
Indeed, some courts have acknowledged that firms can limit damages in
arbitration in ways that they cannot limit them in court.134
c. Anti-Injunction Clauses.—Many areas of law provide for injunctive
relief.135 Injunctive relief is often critical to remedy violations of the law.
For example, in the context of antitrust law, injunctions may be necessary to
restore the competitive marketplace and to eliminate the “lingering effects”
of illegal anticompetitive conduct.136 In general, businesses cannot require
their customers and employees to preemptively waive their right to injunctive
relief. In expanding the reach of arbitration clauses, the Supreme Court
explicitly assumed that “arbitrators do have the power to fashion equitable
relief.”137 Businesses, however, sometimes use arbitration clauses to limit
injunctive remedies.138 Some lawyers encourage their colleagues to use

actually bans a treble damage award on plaintiffs’ antitrust claim is . . . . [an] issue [that] must first
be resolved by the arbitrator.”).
131. Donald I. Baker & Mark R. Stabile, Arbitration of Antitrust Claims: Opportunities and
Hazards for Corporate Counsel, 48 BUS. LAW. 395, 410 n.85 (1993) (“It is not clear whether
arbitration tribunals are obliged to award mandatory treble damages by virtue of the Clayton Act.”);
Robert Pitofsky, Arbitration and Antitrust Enforcement, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1072, 1079 (1969)
(regarding mandatory treble damages and attorney’s fees, “neither of those statutory provisions
would be binding on the arbitrator”).
132. 7-Eleven, Inc. v. Dar, 757 N.E.2d 515, 523 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (“Therefore, if the arbitrator
awarded punitive damages in this case, he would have exceeded his authority.”).
133. See Larry’s United Super, Inc. v. Werries, 253 F.3d 1083, 1085–86 (8th Cir. 2001)
(allowing arbiter to determine whether a damage-limitation provision is unenforceable because it
violates public policy).
134. See, e.g., Stark v. Sandberg, Phx. & Von Gontard, P.C., 381 F.3d 793, 800 (8th Cir. 2004)
(discussing punitive damages and recognizing that “the FAA allows parties to incorporate terms
into arbitration agreements that are contrary to state law”).
135. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 26 (2012) (authorizing injunctive relief “against threatened loss or
damage by a violation of the antitrust laws”).
136. See, e.g., Wilk v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 895 F.2d 352, 366–67 (7th Cir. 1990) (upholding the
grant of an injunction against an unlawful boycott).
137. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 32 (1991).
138. Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Fla. E. Coast Ry., LLC, No. 3:13-cv-576-J-34JRK, 2014 WL
757942, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 26, 2014) (noting that an arbitration provision stated that “the
arbitrator will not determine violations of criminal law and will not issue injunctive relief”).
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arbitration clauses “to exclude injunctive relief” that would otherwise be
available to plaintiffs.139
Even without explicit provisions that preclude injunctive relief, arbiters
are less capable of fashioning and enforcing injunctive remedies. Sometimes,
arbiters simply lack the authority to enjoin defendants from illegal activity.140
Even when an individual plaintiff in arbitration can get relief, she is generally
unable to get a market-wide injunction.141
d. Fee-Shifting Provisions.—Many statutes have pro-plaintiff feeshifting provisions to protect consumers. For example, antitrust law requires
judges to award the successful private plaintiff—but not the successful
defendant—reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.142 Some state consumer
protection and employment laws have similar protections.143 One-way fee
shifting is an important component of many statutory schemes. If the
winning plaintiff cannot recover her attorneys’ fees, then her costs of
pursuing her claim may exceed the maximum possible award.144 This also
makes it unlikely that any attorney would take the case.145
Firms cannot contractually forbid statute-directed fee shifting in many
states. For example, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that parties could
not contract around an attorneys’ fee-shifting provision that encourages
private plaintiffs to enforce a statute.146 Similarly, Ohio courts have held that
contract provisions that impose one-sided fee shifting in favor of business are
not enforceable.147

139. James J. Calder et al., A New Alternative to Antitrust Litigation: Arbitration of Antitrust
Disputes, ANTITRUST, Spring 1989, at 18, 19–20.
140. Gilles & Sebok, supra note 15, at 465 (“[B]ecause arbitrators lack the authority to enjoin
ongoing wrongful activity, each claimant bringing a separate claim has no overall impact on policy
or practices that have widespread effect.”).
141. Doneff, supra note 26, at 76 (“Also, the arbitrator cannot enjoin the wrongdoer from
committing the same wrong against every consumer and simply paying the consequences to the few
who seek damages in arbitration.”).
142. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2012).
143. See, e.g., Kirby v. Immoos Fire Prot., Inc., 274 P.3d 1160, 1166 (2012) (referring to “oneway fee-shifting provision” in CAL. LAB. CODE § 1194 (West 2015)).
144. Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP, 768 F. Supp. 2d 547, 548–49 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) rev’d,
726 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2013).
145. Id. at 550–52.
146. First Baptist Church of Roswell v. Yates Petroleum Corp., 345 P.3d 310, 314–15
(N.M. 2015).
147. Scotts Co. v. Cent. Garden & Pet Co., 403 F.3d 781, 787 (6th Cir. 2005) (“[F]ee-shifting
provisions on preprinted commercial contracts are generally held unenforceable by the Ohio
courts . . . .”); Columbus Check Cashers, Inc. v. Rodgers, No. 08AP-149, 2008 WL 4684781, at *3–
5 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 23, 2008).
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Some firms try to evade pro-plaintiff statutory fee-shifting laws. For
example, they draft their arbitration clauses to preclude all fee shifting.148
Some arbitration clauses mandate two-way fee shifting, requiring whichever
party loses to pay the winner’s costs.149 Finally, some arbitration clauses
attempt to impose one-way fee shifting in favor of defendants, of the sort that
Ohio law prohibits.150
Some courts have found the use of arbitration clauses to manipulate
rules regarding fee shifting to be unconscionable or unenforceable in various
settings. First, some courts have condemned arbitration-imposed two-way
fee shifting provisions as unconscionable. For example, in the Ninth Circuit
a “‘loser pays’ arbitration term was found substantively unconscionable
because it put the plaintiffs in arbitration ‘at risk of incurring greater costs
than they would bear if they were to litigate their claims in federal court.’”151
Second, other courts have found provisions that preclude a successful

148. See, e.g., Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2316 (2013) (Kagan, J.,
dissenting) (“The agreement precludes any shifting of costs to Amex, even if Italian Colors
prevails.”); Graham Oil Co. v. ARCO Prods. Co., 43 F.3d 1244, 1247 (9th Cir. 1995) (evaluating
the validity of an arbitration clause that “provides that each party will bear its own attorney’s fees”);
Valentine v. Wideopen W. Fin., LLC, No. 09 C 07653, 2012 WL 1021809, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 26,
2012) (“The parties expressly waive any entitlement to attorneys’ fees or punitive damages to the
fullest extent permitted by law.”); Gatton v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. SACV 03-130, 2003 WL
21530185, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2003) (“[E]ach party will pay the fees and costs of its own
counsel, experts and witnesses.”); see also CFPB ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 16, § 2, at 66
(“A significant share of credit card arbitration clauses directed that the parties bear their own
attorneys’ fees either without qualification or unless the law or contract requires otherwise (27
clauses, or 40.9%; 46.9% of arbitration-subject credit card loans outstanding).”).
149. E.g., In re Pharmacy Benefit Managers Antitrust Litig., 700 F.3d 109, 113 (3d Cir. 2012)
(“[T]he expenses of the arbitration, including attorneys’ fees, will be paid by the party against whom
the award of the arbitrator is rendered.”); Captain Bounce, Inc. v. Bus. Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 11-CV858, 2012 WL 928412, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2012) (“[T]he costs and fees of such arbitration
shall be borne by the losing party.”); O’Quinn v. Comcast Corp., No. 10 C 2491, 2010 WL 4932665,
at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 29, 2010) (“Only if Comcast prevails in the arbitration does the customer have
to reimburse Comcast for fees and costs advanced up to the extent awardable in a judicial
proceeding.”); see also CFPB ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 16, § 5, at 80 (“Companies were
awarded attorneys’ fees in 14.1% of the 341 disputes resolved by arbitrators.”); Gilles, supra note
79, at 859 (“[C]ustomers who are unsuccessful in arbitrating claims against Comcast and Time
Warner cable must pay those companies’ costs and attorneys’ fees, as well any costs of appealing
the judgment.”).
150. See, e.g., Samaniego v. Empire Today LLC, 140 Cal. Rptr. 3d 492, 499–500 (Cal. Ct. App.
2012) (finding arbitration clause unconscionable, in part, because it “require[d] plaintiffs to pay any
attorneys’ fees incurred by [the defendant], but impose[d] no reciprocal obligation on [the
defendant]”).
151. Captain Bounce, Inc., 2012 WL 928412, at *11 (quoting Pokorny v. Quixtar, Inc., 601
F.3d 987, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010)); see also Zaborowski v. MHN Gov’t Servs., Inc., 601 F. App’x 461,
463 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding a costs-and-fee-shifting clause substantively unconscionable because
it unreasonably and unexpectedly allocated risks); In re Checking Account Overdraft Litig., 485 F.
App’x 403, 406 (11th Cir. 2012) (finding fee-shifting provision unconscionable because it required
“customer to pay the bank’s costs in any dispute between the customer and the bank regardless of
who prevail[ed]”).
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plaintiff from recovering attorneys’ fees to be unconscionable.152 Third, in
pre-Italian Colors cases, some courts invoked the Effective Vindication
Doctrine to invalidate arbitration clauses that blocked pro-plaintiff statutory
fee shifting, reasoning that “the ban on the recovery of attorney’s fees and
costs in the arbitration agreements would burden Plaintiffs here with
prohibitive arbitration costs, preventing Plaintiffs from vindicating their
statutory rights in arbitration.”153
In contrast, some courts invoke the Supreme Court’s call for deference
to arbitration clauses in order to accept firm-imposed interference with proplaintiff fee-shifting regimes.154
e. Forum-Selection Clauses.—State rules can limit judicial deference to
forum-selection clauses. The location of dispute resolution is often critical.
The plaintiff is afforded the choice of forum to level the playing field in
situations in which a small plaintiff is suing a large corporate defendant.155
The parties can, however, pre-designate the court in which litigation will
occur by including a forum-selection clause in their contract. Absent
“extraordinary circumstances,” courts generally enforce forum-selection
clauses.156
In nonarbitration contexts, however, judges can decline to enforce a
forum-selection clause if they conclude that it is unconscionable or otherwise
against public policy. For example, California courts can refuse to enforce a
forum-selection clause that would send cases to jurisdictions—like Utah—
that do not permit enhanced damages or have shorter statutes of limitations
than California provides.157 Judges in California can also prevent transfer of

152. Overdraft Litig., 485 F. App’x at 406 (“[W]e affirm the district court’s finding that the
cost-and-fee-shifting provision was unconscionable under North Carolina law.”); Delta Funding
Corp. v. Harris, 912 A.2d 104, 112 (N.J. 2006); LaCoursiere v. Camwest Dev., Inc., 339 P.3d 963,
970 (Wash. 2014) (citing cases); see also Valentine v. Wideopen W. Fin., LLC, No. 09 C 07653,
2012 WL 1021809, at *5–6 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 26, 2012) (recognizing theoretical possibility that the
denial of attorneys’ fees to a successful plaintiff could make an arbitration clause unconscionable);
Schwartz v. Alltel Corp., No. 86810, 2006 WL 2243649, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. June 29, 2006)
(finding that an arbitration provision eliminating statutorily authorized attorney fees “establish[ed]
a quantum of substantive unconscionability”).
153. Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 52–53 (1st Cir. 2006). In Kristian, the court
severed the fee clause because the governing contract had a savings clause. Id. at 53.
154. See Venture Cotton Coop. v. Freeman, 435 S.W.3d 222, 232 (Tex. 2014) (stating that the
unconscionability of a fee-shifting provision is for the arbiter to decide).
155. John J. Finn, Comment, Private Arbitration and Antitrust Enforcement: A Conflict of
Policies, 10 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 406, 415 (1969).
156. See Valspar Corp. v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 15 F. Supp. 3d 928, 934 (D. Minn.
2014) (noting that the Supreme Court has held that forum-selection clauses should be upheld absent
“extraordinary circumstances”).
157. See, e.g., Sawyer v. Bill Me Later, Inc., No. CV 10-04461, 2010 WL 5289537, at *6 (C.D.
Cal. Oct. 4, 2010) (holding that the Court may not enforce a forum-selection clause if it works
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a case from California courts to Virginia courts because Virginia does not
provide for class actions.158 Consequently, a forum-selection clause that
requires litigation take place in Virginia is unenforceable against California
citizens.159
Firms can evade laws like California’s by embedding their forumselection clause in an arbitration provision.160 Arbitration clauses often
specify the site where any arbitration arising from the contract shall take
place, locations that are sometimes thousands of miles away from the
plaintiff.161 Although some states would invalidate such provisions,162 state
prohibitions on out-of-state arbitration may be considered preempted by the
FAA in light of the Supreme Court’s pro-arbitration jurisprudence.163
f. Non-Coordination Clauses.—Some arbitration clauses forbid not only
class actions, but all coordination among the victims of illegal conduct.
Arbitration clauses commonly contain confidentiality requirements.164 This
can prevent cost sharing or even information sharing among plaintiffs
seeking to recover for their injuries. For example, the agreement at issue in
Italian Colors precluded the plaintiffs from even informally arranging among
themselves to pay for a common expert report that each could use in

against an important public policy interest in California, such as the ability to commence a class
action suit).
158. Doe 1 v. AOL LLC, 552 F.3d 1077, 1084 (9th Cir. 2009) (“As to such California resident
plaintiffs, Mendoza holds California public policy is violated by forcing such plaintiffs to waive
their rights to a class action and remedies under California consumer law.”).
159. Id.; Am. Online, Inc. v. Superior Court, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 699, 712 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001)
(“The unavailability of class action relief in this context is sufficient in and by itself to preclude
enforcement of the TOS forum-selection clause.”).
160. See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519 (1974) (“An agreement to arbitrate
before a specified tribunal is, in effect, a specialized kind of forum-selection clause . . . .”); Venture
Cotton Coop. v. Freeman, 435 S.W.3d 222, 229 (Tex. 2014) (“[A]rbitration agreements typically
function simply as forum-selection clauses . . . .”).
161. See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 617,
640 (1985) (involving a Puerto Rican corporation that had to submit to arbitration in Japan because
of the arbitration clause to which it had agreed).
162. Ware, supra note 125, at 1026 (“Another example of an arbitration clause that might be
substantively unconscionable is one requiring arbitration far from the non-drafting party’s home.”);
see, e.g., Kubis & Perszyk Assocs., Inc. v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., 680 A.2d 618, 626 (N.J. 1996)
(“[F]orum-selection clauses in contracts subject to the Franchise Act . . . . are presumptively invalid
because they fundamentally conflict with the basic legislative objectives of protecting franchisees
from the superior bargaining power of franchisors and providing swift and effective judicial relief
against franchisors that violate the Act.”).
163. Ware, supra note 125, at 1028 (“[S]tate statutes denying enforcement to clauses providing
for arbitration outside the state are also preempted by the FAA.”).
164. Jon Bauer, Buying Witness Silence: Evidence-Suppressing Settlements and Lawyers’
Ethics, 87 OR. L. REV. 481, 490–96 (2008); Philip Rothman, Psst, Please Keep It Confidential:
Arbitration Makes It Possible, DISP. RESOL. J., Sept. 1994, at 69, 69.
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individual arbitration proceedings.165 Such coordination would be absolutely
necessary in the absence of class actions—which the contract explicitly
prohibited—because no individual victim alone could afford to pay for an
expert report.166 As Justice Kagan noted in dissent, the agreement imposed
by Amex “cut[] off not just class arbitration, but any avenue for sharing,
shifting, or shrinking necessary costs. Amex has put Italian Colors to this
choice: Spend way, way, way more money than your claim is worth, or
relinquish your Sherman Act rights.”167 Despite the proffered efficiency
justifications for arbitration, this provision was designed to create inefficiency
in order to make claims against the defendant cost prohibitive.168
Prior to Concepcion, some state courts refused to enforce noncoordination agreements in arbitration clauses. For example, Ohio courts can
invalidate confidentiality agreements where sharing information regarding
consumer claims is important for the public at large.169 Professor Jon Bauer
has noted that judges in courts “increasingly insist that protective orders
provide for discovery sharing with plaintiffs in similar cases and refuse to
enforce private noncooperation agreements when they interfere with
discovery or informal investigation in another proceeding.”170 Arbitrators are
not similarly reticent, given their penchant for confidentiality. Firms, indeed,
have argued that “Concepcion prevents state courts from disturbing
confidentiality agreements included within arbitration agreements.”171
g. Multiple Unconscionable Terms.—Sometimes a combination of the
above terms can make an arbitration agreement unconscionable. When a
class action waiver is coupled with a bar on awarding attorneys’ fees to
successful plaintiffs, courts may be more inclined to find the provisions
unenforceable than they would if the agreement contained only one of the
two provisions.172 For example, the Ninth Circuit found “an arbitration

165. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2316 (2013) (Kagan, J.,
dissenting) (“The agreement also disallows any kind of joinder or consolidation of claims or parties.
And more: Its confidentiality provision prevents Italian Colors from informally arranging with other
merchants to produce a common expert report.”).
166. See supra notes 97–101 and accompanying text.
167. Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2316 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
168. See Schnuerle v. Insight Commc’ns Co., 376 S.W.3d 561, 578 (Ky. 2012) (“Further, the
potential obstacles to arbitration presented by the forbidding of class action waivers are simply not
present in the case of confidentially [sic] provisions.”).
169. Eagle v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 809 N.E.2d 1161, 1180–83 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004); see
also Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1151–52 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding confidentiality provision in
arbitration clause unconscionable).
170. Bauer, supra note 164, at 494–95 (footnotes omitted).
171. Schnuerle, 376 S.W.3d at 578 (rejecting this argument).
172. See Jenkins v. First Am. Cash Advance of Ga., LLC, 400 F.3d 868, 877–78 (11th Cir.
2005) (rejecting the argument that a class action waiver renders an arbitration clause unconscionable
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agreement substantively unconscionable upon review of the agreement’s
provisions, including claims subject to arbitration, its statute of limitations,
class actions, fee and cost-splitting arrangements, remedies available, and
termination/modification of the agreement.”173 Thus, even if an individual
anti-consumer term does not make a contract (or its arbitration clause)
unconscionable, the aggregate effect may be to do so.
3. Concepcion as a Blueprint for Bootstrapping.—Although
Concepcion specifically struck down only California’s rule against certain
class action waivers, the opinion has potential implications beyond those
waivers. By holding that judges cannot use the unconscionability doctrine to
invalidate a term embedded in an arbitration agreement, Concepcion risks
limiting the ability of courts to hold other unconscionable contract terms
unenforceable. Some judges have lamented that “post-Concepcion, courts
may not apply state public policy concerns to invalidate an arbitration
agreement even if the public policy at issue aims to prevent undesirable
results to consumers.”174 So long as a firm inserts an otherwise unenforceable, unconscionable term in an arbitration agreement, Concepcion could
prevent lower courts from invalidating that unconscionable term.175
The unconscionable terms detailed above have more vitality in a postConcepcion environment. For example, before Concepcion, some states held
that firms could not use arbitration clauses to circumvent the prescribed
statute of limitations, and that to do so would be unconscionable.176 A
California court, for instance, held that “[t]he shortened limitations period
provided by [the] arbitration agreement is unconscionable and insufficient to
protect [the company’s] employees’ right to vindicate their statutory
rights.”177 Such holdings may not survive Concepcion, as courts have
speculated that Concepcion may preempt state laws against shortening

because attorneys’ fees were still available and “when the opportunity to recover attorneys’ fees is
available, lawyers will be willing to represent such debtors in arbitration”).
173. Perez v. Apollo Educ. Grp., Inc., No. 1:14–cv–00605, 2014 WL 5797148, at *4 (E.D. Cal.
Nov. 6, 2014) (citing Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1180 (9th Cir. 2003)); see
also Newton v. Am. Debt Servs., Inc., 549 F. App’x 692, 694 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding arbitration
clause unconscionable in part because it required California residents to arbitrate in Oklahoma).
174. Robinson v. Title Lenders, Inc., 364 S.W.3d 505, 515 (Mo. 2012).
175. See infra notes 187–87 and accompanying text; see also Muriithi v. Shuttle Express, Inc.,
712 F.3d 173, 180 (4th Cir. 2013) (Concepcion “was not merely an assertion of federal preemption,
but also plainly prohibited application of the general contract defense of unconscionability to
invalidate an otherwise valid arbitration agreement under these circumstances”).
176. E.g., Apollo Educ. Grp., 2014 WL 5797148, at *5 (“Generally, provisions strictly
requiring employees to bring all claims within one year are unconscionable.”); Jewelers Mut. Ins.
Co. v. ADT Sec. Servs., Inc., No. C 08-02035, 2008 WL 5383371, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2008)
(“Thus, the Court finds, as a matter of law, that the contractual period of limitation is unconscionable
and unenforceable.”).
177. Martinez v. Master Prot. Corp., 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 663, 672 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
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statutes of limitations from being applied to arbitration clauses.178 In one
recent case, although the Maryland district court found that an arbitration
clause’s reduced one-year statute of limitations was unconscionable under
the applicable state contract law, the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that
Concepcion generally preempts unconscionability arguments against
arbitration clauses.179 The implications are staggering: simply by placing an
unconscionable contract term in an arbitration agreement, firms can make
unconscionable terms enforceable.
Concepcion could also make it more difficult for lower courts to enforce
state and federal rules against damage-limitation clauses.
Before
Concepcion, courts split on whether and when businesses could use
arbitration agreements to limit damages.180 Those courts that held damage
limitations in arbitration clauses to be unenforceable did so primarily based
on the doctrine of unconscionability.181 For example, Florida courts had
found damage-limitation provisions to be an “indicator of substantive
unconscionability” when an “arbitration clause expressly limits [a
defendant’s] liability to actual damages, thereby precluding the possibility
that [the defendant] will ever be exposed to punitive damages, no matter how
outrageous its conduct might be.”182 Similarly, California courts held that
“[a] damages limitation may be unconscionable if it contravenes public
policy by limiting remedies available in the statute under which a plaintiff
proceeds, or if it is one-sided.”183 But because Concepcion casts doubt on
courts’ ability to invalidate arbitration clause provisions based on uncon-

178. See D’Antuono v. Serv. Rd. Corp., 789 F. Supp. 2d 308, 330–31 (D. Conn. 2011) (noting
that if arbitration agreements with provisions to shorten the statute of limitations were deemed
unconscionable as a matter of state law, the FAA might preempt such a state law in light of
Concepcion’s preemption analysis).
179. Muriithi, 712 F.3d at 178, 180.
180. Compare Inv. Partners, L.P. v. Glamour Shots Licensing, Inc., 298 F.3d 314, 318 n.1 (5th
Cir. 2002) (“Provisions in arbitration agreements that prohibit punitive damages are generally
enforceable.”), and McKee v. AT&T Corp., 191 P.3d 845, 860 (Wash. 2008) (“We hold the
limitation on punitive damages is not unconscionable.”), with Booker v. Robert Half Int’l, Inc., 413
F.3d 77, 83 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“[A]rbitration agreement’s bar on punitive damages is
unenforceable . . . .”), and In re Poly-Am., L.P., 262 S.W.3d 337, 352 (Tex. 2008) (“Permitting an
employer to contractually absolve itself of this statutory remedy [(punitive damages)] would
undermine the deterrent purpose [of the law].”).
181. See, e.g., Gatton v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. SACV 03-130, 2003 WL 21530185, at *11
(C.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2003) (“The damages limitation, therefore, while not determinative, is among
the group of factors that may contribute to a finding of unconscionability.”); Harper v. Ultimo, 7
Cal. Rptr. 3d 418, 423 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (listing courts rejecting arbitration clauses based on
substantive unconscionability); Frank’s Maint. & Eng’g, Inc. v. C.A. Roberts Co., 408 N.E.2d 403,
409–10 (Ill. Ct. App. 1980) (noting that under the UCC consequential-damage limitations were
prima facie unconscionable where personal injuries are involved).
182. Powertel, Inc. v. Bexley, 743 So. 2d 570, 576 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
183. Htay Htay Chin v. Advanced Fresh Concepts Franchise Corp., 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d 547, 555
(Cal. Ct. App. 2011).
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scionability, courts have suggested that, in light of Concepcion, such holdings may no longer be valid.184
And Concepcion could make it easier for firms to use arbitration clauses
as a mechanism to prevent injunctive relief. Before Concepcion, courts
invalidated anti-injunction clauses in arbitration agreements as unconscionable.185 Some courts, however, have read Concepcion to preclude such
invalidation of anti-injunction clauses in arbitration.186 For example, lower
courts have interpreted Concepcion as invalidating California’s law that
prohibited arbitration of claims requesting public injunctive relief.187 Thus,
California courts can refuse to enforce anti-injunction clauses in a contract
without an arbitration clause. However, if a firm wishes to preclude certain
injunctive relief, it can put that same—previously unenforceable—term in an
arbitration clause and state judges are powerless to invalidate the term.
Judges reason that after Concepcion, “the FAA ‘preempts California’s
preclusion of public injunctive relief claims from arbitration . . . .’”188 More
broadly, some courts have held that plaintiffs’ arguments challenging
prohibitions on injunctive relief and punitive damages as “unconscionable
because they undermine pro-consumer policies . . . are not viable postConcepcion because state laws advancing those policies are preempted by
the FAA.”189
The combination of Italian Colors and Concepcion may inhibit judges’
ability to reject oppressive forum-selection clauses. Courts previously relied
on the Effective Vindication Doctrine and the unconscionability doctrine to
constrain firms’ ability to use an arbitration provision to impose an antiplaintiff forum-selection clause. For example, in Mitsubishi, the Supreme
184. Alvarez v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. Civ. 2:10-2373, 2011 WL 6702424, at *7 (E.D. Cal.
Dec. 21, 2011).
185. E.g., Powertel, Inc., 743 So. 2d at 576; see also Lozada v. Dale Baker Oldsmobile, Inc.,
91 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1105 (W.D. Mich. 2000) (striking down provisions in arbitration clauses that
denied arbiters the power to grant injunctive relief).
186. E.g., Arellano v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. C 10-05663, 2011 WL 1842712, at *2 (N.D.
Cal. May 16, 2011) (“[T]he Act preempts California’s exemption of claims for public injunctive
relief from arbitration, at least for actions in federal court.”); see also Schatz v. Cellco P’ship, 842
F. Supp. 2d 594, 613 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“[T]he Court would be hard-pressed to say that the plaintiffs’
inability to obtain ‘general injunctive relief’ on behalf of others would render the arbitral forum
inadequate.”).
187. See, e.g., Kilgore v. KeyBank, Nat’l Ass’n, 673 F.3d 947, 960 (9th Cir. 2012) (“We hold
that the Broughton–Cruz rule does not survive Concepcion because the rule ‘prohibits outright the
arbitration of a particular type of claim’—claims for broad public injunctive relief.” (quoting AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1747 (2011))), aff’d on reh’g, 718 F.3d 1052 (9th
Cir. 2013); Alan S. Kaplinsky, Mark J. Levin & Martin C. Bryce, Jr., Arbitration Developments:
Post-Concepcion—The Supreme Court Expands Upon Its Landmark Decision, 69 BUS. LAW. 647,
652 n.45 (2014) (collecting cases).
188. Hendricks v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 823 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1024 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (quoting
Arellano, 2011 WL 1842712, at *1).
189. Alvarez, 2011 WL 6702424, at *7.
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Court noted that if “the choice-of-forum and choice-of-law clauses operated
in tandem as a prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue statutory
remedies . . . , we would have little hesitation in condemning the agreement
as against public policy.”190 This is an application of the Effective
Vindication Doctrine. To similar effect, applying the unconscionability
doctrine, one California court invalidated a forum-selection clause because
the “plaintiffs were required to travel [from California] to Washington, D.C.
to litigate a claim worth ‘a couple of hundred dollars.’”191 Because the Court
in Italian Colors and Concepcion undermined the Effective Vindication
Doctrine and the unconscionability doctrine, respectively, prior opinions
striking down forum-selection clauses are weakened. In the wake of
Concepcion, courts are already less receptive to the argument that forumselection clauses that make plaintiffs travel great distances to arbitration are
unconscionable and, thus, unenforceable.192
Finally, in light of the above post-Concepcion holdings that pare back
the ability of courts to protect consumers and employees from unconscionable—or otherwise unenforceable—terms in arbitration agreements, the
legal landscape does not bode well for other anti-plaintiff terms. For
example, courts have speculated that Concepcion may prevent courts from
invalidating fee-shifting provisions in arbitration clauses that judges would
otherwise find to be unenforceable due to unconscionability.193 Courts are
also more likely to uphold the insertion of anti-coordination terms into
arbitration clauses in light of Italian Colors, in which the Supreme Court
endorsed enforcement of an arbitration clause that contained an aggressive
non-coordination requirement.194 Even when firms load their arbitration
clauses with a multitude of unconscionable terms, courts have suggested that
Concepcion may preempt state laws that would use the unconscionability
doctrine to strike down either the individual terms or the arbitration clause as
a whole.195
In sum, by limiting the ability of courts to use the unconscionability
doctrine as a method of constraining anti-plaintiff terms in an arbitration

190. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 n.19 (1985).
191. Gillette v. First Premiere Bank, No. 3:13-CV-432, 2013 WL 3205827, at *4 (S.D. Cal.
June 24, 2013) (quoting Chavez v. Bank of Am., No. C 10-653, 2011 WL 4712204, at *11 (N.D.
Cal. Oct. 7, 2011)).
192. See, e.g., Carrell v. L & S Plumbing P’ship, No. H-10-2523, 2011 WL 3300067, at *1, *4
(S.D. Tex. Aug. 1, 2011) (compelling arbitration and dismissing case in favor of arbitration).
193. See D’Antuono v. Serv. Rd. Corp., 789 F. Supp. 2d 308, 331 (D. Conn. 2011) (explaining
that Connecticut unconscionability law may be preempted by the FAA post-Concepcion).
194. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2316 (2013) (Kagan, J.,
dissenting) (emphasizing the aggressiveness of the non-coordination requirement in the arbitration
clause before the Court).
195. E.g., D’Antuono, 789 F. Supp. 2d at 330–31.
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clause, Concepcion encourages firms to load their arbitration agreements
with otherwise unenforceable provisions.
D.

State Efforts to Protect Consumers

Many states have sought to protect their citizens from overreaching
arbitration provisions. States have tried three approaches, all of which the
Supreme Court has invalidated as inconsistent with the FAA. First, some
states had made certain categories of disputes non-arbitrable. For example,
California law made worker actions for unpaid wages non-arbitrable196 and
the West Virginia Supreme Court held that arbitration agreements in nursinghome contracts did not apply to lawsuits for “personal injury or wrongful
death.”197 The U.S. Supreme Court held that the FAA preempted California’s
law to protect workers.198 The Court similarly characterized West Virginia’s
rule as “contrary to the terms and coverage of the FAA” and thus invalid.199
States, in short, cannot make specific claims non-arbitrable.
Second, states sought to apply the contract doctrine of unconscionability
to make certain anti-consumer terms in arbitration clauses unenforceable.200
The Concepcion opinion blocked these efforts with respect to class action
waivers. Lower courts have expanded Concepcion in order to prevent states
from invalidating a variety of unconscionable contract terms, so long as the
terms are coupled with an arbitration clause.201
Third, unable to cordon off areas of law from arbitration or to address
specific anti-consumer terms, some states sought to insure that their citizens
were at least informed that they were waiving their right to sue in court. A
Montana statute, for instance, rendered arbitration clauses unenforceable
unless the first page of the contract contained a notice “typed in underlined
capital letters” that alerted readers to the arbitration clause contained
within.202 The Supreme Court invalidated the Montana law because
“Montana’s first-page notice requirement, which governs not ‘any contract,’

196. CAL. LAB. CODE § 229 (West 2011) (“Actions to enforce the provisions of this article for
the collection of due and unpaid wages claimed by an individual may be maintained without regard
to the existence of any private agreement to arbitrate.”), invalidated by Discover Bank v. Superior
Court, 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 393, 407–08 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
197. Brown ex rel. Brown v. Genesis Healthcare Corp., 724 S.E.2d 250, 292 (W. Va. 2011)
(“We therefore hold that, as a matter of public policy under West Virginia law, an arbitration clause
in a nursing home admission agreement adopted prior to an occurrence of negligence that results in
a personal injury or wrongful death, shall not be enforced to compel arbitration of a dispute
concerning the negligence.”), vacated sub nom. Marmet Health Care Ctr. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201,
1204 (2012).
198. Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 491 (1987).
199. Marmet Health Care Ctr., 132 S. Ct. at 1204.
200. See supra notes 74–81 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 187–87 and accompanying text.
202. Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 683 (1996).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2775437

LESLIE.TOPRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

11/25/2015 1:59 PM

The Arbitration Bootstrap

297

but specifically and solely contracts ‘subject to arbitration,’ conflicts with the
FAA and is therefore displaced by the federal measure.”203 Other state laws
requiring consumer notice of arbitration clauses were subsequently struck
down as well.204 The Court’s approach precludes states from even experimenting with methods to minimize the negative consequences of anticonsumer arbitration clauses.205
This illustrates the clout of arbitration clauses in the landscape of
contract law. In the absence of arbitration clauses, states have the power to
prevent firms using contractual provisions to waive class actions, limit
damages, truncate statutes of limitations, or preclude injunctions. But,
according to some case law, the mere inclusion of these same provisions in
an arbitration clause saps the states of their ability to protect their citizens.
Similarly, the state’s traditional power to require notices in consumer
contracts recedes in the face of an arbitration clause.
II.

The Role of Legislative Intent in the Expansion of Arbitration Clauses

We now have a legal regime where consumers and workers are forced
to sign away their right to sue in court and states are essentially powerless to
protect their citizens. We have arrived here because the Supreme Court has
repeatedly asserted that “‘[t]he preeminent concern of Congress in passing
the [Federal Arbitration] Act was to enforce private agreements into which
parties had entered,’ a concern which ‘requires that we rigorously enforce
agreements to arbitrate.’”206 The Supreme Court has claimed three distinct
intentions of the 1925 Congress that passed the FAA: an intent that the FAA
apply to all federal and state claims unless explicitly exempted by Congress;
an intent that the terms of arbitration clauses should be enforced as written;
and an intent that states cannot do anything that would disfavor arbitration
clauses or interfere with their enforcement. This Part presents the Supreme
Court’s construction of this legislative intent.
For over the first half century of the FAA’s existence, courts held that
federal statutory rights were non-arbitrable.207 Beginning in the 1980s,
however, the Court began to assert that Congress intended the FAA to create
an “emphatic federal policy in favor of arbitral dispute resolution.”208 This
congressional intent, in turn, required that “questions of arbitrability must be

203. Id.
204. See, e.g., Affiliated Foods Midwest Coop., Inc. v. Integrated Distribution Sols., LLC, 460
F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1072 (D. Neb. 2006) (striking down NEB. REV. STAT. § 25–2602.02).
205. Sarah Rudolph Cole, The Federalization of Consumer Arbitration: Possible Solutions,
2013 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 271, 276–77.
206. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625–26 (1985)
(emphasis added) (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985)).
207. See supra notes 28–30 and accompanying text.
208. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 631.
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addressed with a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration.”209
Thus, in 1983, the Court asserted for the first time that “[t]he Arbitration Act
establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope
of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.”210 This
presumption of arbitrability could only be rebutted by proof that “Congress
intended to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at
issue.”211 The burden of proving this rests on the party seeking to avoid
arbitration.212
In addition to discovering a congressional intent to broaden the scope of
the FAA, courts have held that they must enforce anti-consumer terms in
arbitration clauses because Congress intended this. Most notably, the
Supreme Court has claimed that Congress intended the FAA to preempt state
laws against class action waivers in arbitration clauses.213 In forbidding states
from treating class action waivers in arbitration clauses as unconscionable,
the Supreme Court asserted that “[t]he ‘principal purpose’ of the FAA is to
‘ensur[e] that private arbitration agreements are enforced according to their
terms.’”214 In requiring lower courts to enforce class action waivers in
arbitration clauses, the Court held that all “courts must ‘rigorously enforce’
arbitration agreements according to their terms.”215
Since the Supreme Court pro-arbitration era began in the 1980s, the
Court has claimed in over a dozen opinions that Congress intended arbitration
clauses to be enforced “as written” or “according to their terms.”216 For

209. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
210. Id. at 24–25; see also Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 627–28 (“[T]he congressional policy
manifested in the Federal Arbitration Act . . . requires courts liberally to construe the scope of
arbitration agreements covered by that Act.”).
211. Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 227 (1987).
212. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991).
213. Aton Arbisser & Darya Pollak, Concepcion and the Future of Pre-Dispute Arbitration
Agreements, 13 SEDONA CONF. J. 207, 208, 209 n.17 (2012) (collecting cases).
214. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011) (second alteration in
original) (emphasis added) (quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior
Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989)).
215. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309 (2013) (quoting Dean
Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985)).
216. E.g., Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2309; CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665,
669 (2012); Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1754; Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 67–
68 (2010); Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287, 301 n.8 (2010); Stolt-Nielsen
S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 682 (2010); Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc.,
552 U.S. 576, 593 (2008); Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 454 (2003); Doctor’s
Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 688 (1996); Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton,
Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 57 (1995); First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 947 (1995); Volt,
489 U.S. at 476; see also, e.g., Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 87 (2002)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (“[C]ourts must enforce private agreements to arbitrate just as they would
ordinary contracts: in accordance with their terms.”); J. Alexander Sec., Inc. v. Mendez, 511 U.S.
1150, 1151 (1994) (O’Connor, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
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example, the Concepcion Court asserted that “[t]he overarching purpose of
the FAA, evident in the text of §§ 2, 3, and 4, is to ensure the enforcement of
arbitration agreements according to their terms so as to facilitate streamlined
proceedings.”217 Thus, if an arbitration clause term forbids class actions and
classwide arbitrations, Congress—according to the Concepcion majority—
intended judges to defer to that term.218 To treat such a term as unconscionable under state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”219 Under this
approach, courts defer to all manner of anti-consumer contract terms, as long
as the terms are situated within an arbitration clause.
State efforts to protect their citizens from overreaching arbitration
clauses have also butted up against the Supreme Court’s vision of the
congressional intent behind the FAA. In Southland Corp. v. Keating,220 the
Supreme Court asserted that “Congress intended to foreclose state legislative
attempts to undercut the enforceability of arbitration agreements.”221 Thus,
the Southland Court construed the FAA to require state courts to enforce
agreements to arbitrate state law claims. Almost sixty years after the
enactment of the FAA, Southland was the first time that the Justices ever
even considered whether the FAA applied to state courts and, by extension,
state consumer protection laws.222
In addition to expanding the reach of the FAA in the 1980s to include
federal statutory claims, the Court also asserted that Congress intended to
forbid states from making any state claims non-arbitrable.223 For example,
the Southland opinion asserted: “Congress declared a national policy
favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial
forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to
resolve by arbitration.”224 The Court has further claimed that Congress
intended to prevent states from doing anything to protect their citizens from
unconscionable arbitration clauses imposed through contracts of adhesion.
217. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 1753 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)) (“California’s Discover
Bank rule is preempted by the FAA.”). State courts have reasoned similarly. See, e.g., AutoNation
USA Corp. v. Leroy, 105 S.W.3d 190, 200 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (“[T]he
primary purpose of the FAA is to overcome courts’ refusals to enforce agreements to arbitrate and
to ensure that private agreements to arbitrate are enforced according to their terms.”).
220. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
221. Id. at 16. The Supreme Court inferred that Congress must have intended to preempt state
law because the legislators could not bother “to address a problem whose impact was confined to
federal courts,” and it claimed that “the House Report contemplated a broad reach of the Act,
unencumbered by state-law constraints.” Id. at 13.
222. Id. at 24 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“Today’s case is the first in which this Court has had
occasion to determine whether the FAA applies to state-court proceedings.”).
223. See Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 490–91, 491 n.8 (1987).
224. Southland, 465 U.S. at 10.
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For example, in striking down Montana’s requirement that contracts must
clearly state if they contain an arbitration clause, the Court reiterated “we
have several times said, Congress precluded States from singling out
arbitration provisions for suspect status . . . .”225 Abiding by the Supreme
Court’s pronouncements, courts have asserted that Congress intended the
FAA to prevent states from requiring that judges, not private arbiters, hear
claims for injunctive relief.226
In sum, judges have constructed a regime where the legal claims of
consumers and employees must be decided in private arbitration, not in court.
Judges have achieved this by invoking a legislative history of the FAA in
which Congress intended to favor private arbitration over public litigation;
Congress intended arbitration to cover federal statutory claims; Congress
intended firms to be able to use contracts of adhesion to force consumers and
employees to waive their rights to sue in court; Congress intended firms to
be able to impose arbitration clauses that prevent class actions, that limit
damages, that truncate statutes of limitations, and that preclude injunctive
relief; and Congress intended to prevent states from being able to protect their
citizens from arbitration clauses and their unconscionable terms even if that
eliminated the ability of injured individuals to seek redress in any forum.
Part III will show that each of these claims of legislative intent is false.
III. Revisiting the Legislative History of the FAA
A.

The Legislative History of the FAA

Even before the founding of the country, some American businesses
sought to resolve their disputes through private arbitration instead of public
litigation.227 However, the holdings of private arbiters had no legal power
absent court enforcement.228 Under the so-called revocability doctrine, either
party could, at its will, refuse to honor the arbitration agreement.229 While
225. Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996).
226. E.g., Arellano v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. C 10-05663, 2011 WL 1842712, at *1 (N.D.
Cal. May 16, 2011).
227. James E. Berger & Charlene Sun, The Evolution of Judicial Review Under the Federal
Arbitration Act, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 745, 748 (2009).
228. Id.
229. Southland, 465 U.S. at 32 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that judicial “hostility [to
arbitration agreements] was reflected in two different doctrines: ‘revocability,’ which allowed
parties to repudiate arbitration agreements at any time before the arbitrator’s award was made, and
‘invalidity’ or ‘unenforceability,’ equivalent rules that flatly denied any remedy for the failure to
honor an arbitration agreement” (footnotes omitted)); Charles Newton Hulvey, Arbitration of
Commercial Disputes, 15 VA. L. REV. 238, 239–41 (1929) (comparing the law of arbitration
agreements under common law with statutes); Wilson, supra note 91, at 98–99 (“If one party to the
arbitration agreement decided it no longer wanted to arbitrate, courts refused to compel arbitration,
allowing the objecting party to revoke its agreement. This rule, followed by most state and federal
courts, was referred to as the ‘revocability doctrine.’”); see also Berger & Sun, supra note 227, at
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such revocation was problematic to the party desiring to enforce an
arbitration agreement, American courts followed the English rule that
“traditionally considered irrevocable arbitration agreements as ‘ousting’ the
courts of jurisdiction” and, thus, unenforceable.230 The Supreme Court, for
example, had held in the late nineteenth century that “parties cannot by
contract oust the ordinary courts of their jurisdiction.”231 Supporters of the
FAA characterized the English rule as founded on “the jealousy of the
English courts for their own jurisdiction.”232 American courts, nonetheless,
felt obliged to follow the well-established rule. One district court judge in
New York opined in 1915 that American “courts will scarcely permit any
other body of men to even partially perform judicial work, and will never
permit the absorption of all the business growing out of disputes over a
contract by any body of arbitrators, unless compelled to such action by
statute.”233
In 1920, the New York legislature responded to the judge’s invitation to
“compel action” by enacting a statute that made arbitration agreements
enforceable.234 Although states like New York and New Jersey passed laws
that made arbitration agreements enforceable in state court, these laws could
not reach claims that sounded in admiralty—which was governed by federal
law—or cases that wound up in federal court through diversity jurisdiction.235
Because federal courts treated arbitration agreements as revocable, mer-

750–51 (“Finally, without reliable support from the courts, adherence to an arbitration award was
often privately enforced by extra-judicial means, such as threats to a merchant’s reciprocal
arrangements or reputation.”).
230. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510 n.4 (1974). On the English courts’
hostility to private arbitration, see David Horton, Arbitration as Delegation, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437,
444–45 (2011).
231. Ins. Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445, 451 (1874) (“[A man] cannot, however, bind
himself in advance by an agreement, which may be specially enforced, thus to forfeit his rights at
all times and on all occasions, whenever the case may be presented.”).
232. H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1–2 (1924) (“This jealousy survived for so lon[g] a period that
the principle became firmly embedded in the English common law and was adopted with it by the
American courts.”); see also Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 270 (1995)
(“[T]he basic purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act is to overcome courts’ refusals to enforce
agreements to arbitrate.”); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991) (“[The
FAA’s] purpose was to reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements that had
existed at English common law and had been adopted by American courts . . . .”).
233. U.S. Asphalt Ref. Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co., 222 F. 1006, 1010–11 (S.D.N.Y.
1915).
234. Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Joint Hearings on S. 1005 and H.R. 646
Before the Subcomms. of the Comms. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 39 (1924) [hereinafter Joint
Hearings]; Berger & Sun, supra note 225, at 750; Margaret L. Moses, Statutory Misconstruction:
How the Supreme Court Created a Federal Arbitration Law Never Enacted by Congress, 34 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 99, 101 (2006) (“The New York statute made all arbitration agreements enforceable,
including agreements to arbitrate future disputes.”).
235. See Joint Hearings, supra note 232, at 16 (statement of Julius Henry Cohen) (explaining
that state arbitration laws did not apply to cases that “came into the Federal court”).
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chants that entered pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate could not be certain
that their agreements would be enforced.
The push for federal legislation to make arbitration agreements
enforceable was spearheaded by two New Yorkers—Julius Cohen and
Charles Bernheimer—who sought to replicate at the federal level their
success in shepherding through New York State’s law. Both men worked for
the New York State Chamber of Commerce—the primary mover behind New
York’s arbitration law—Cohen as its general counsel and Bernheimer as the
chair of its arbitration committee, a position he had been elected to twelve
times.236 Cohen was also a member of the Committee on Commerce, Trade,
and Commercial Law of the American Bar Association (ABA),237 which
actually drafted the FAA.238 In 1924, Bernheimer was the primary private
witness who testified before Congress. In addition to representing the
Importers and Exporters’ Association and the Merchants’ Association of
New York, he spoke as a representative of “73 business men’s organizations
that have added their names in formal indorsement” of the FAA.239 Together,
Cohen and Bernheimer presented the case to Congress for why arbitration
agreements should be enforceable in federal court.240
In urging Congress to enact the FAA, Cohen and Bernheimer argued
that arbitration held many advantages over traditional litigation. First,
arbitration was less expensive than litigation. Cohen asserted that “the bar
associations of the country” were aligned with the community in supporting
arbitration as a way “to make the disposition of business in the commercial
world less expensive.”241 Typical of the business community’s support of the
FAA, the American Bankers’ Association presented a resolution to Congress
that “arbitration offers the best means yet devised for an efficient,

236. Moses, supra note 234, at 101.
237. Joint Hearings, supra note 232, at 13 (statement of Julius Henry Cohen).
238. The House Report noted that the FAA was drafted by an American Bar Association
committee. H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1 (1924) (“[This bill] was drafted by a committee of the
American Bar Association and is sponsored by that association and by a large number of trade
bodies whose representatives appeared before the committee on the hearing.”). The proposed bill
was unanimously passed by the ABA. Sales and Contracts to Sell in Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, and Federal Commercial Arbitration: Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214 Before a
Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong. 9 (1923) [hereinafter Arbitration Hearings]
(statement of W.H.H. Piatt).
239. Joint Hearings, supra note 232, at 5–6 (statement of Charles L. Bernheimer, Chairman,
Comm. on Arbitration, Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York).
240. The testimony of Cohen and Bernheimer is important, as the modern Supreme Court has
relied upon their testimony in interpreting the FAA. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513
U.S. 265, 274, 279 (1995).
241. Joint Hearings, supra note 232, at 13 (statement of Julius Henry Cohen).
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expeditious, and inexpensive adjustment of such disputes.”242 Congress was
influenced by the testimony in praise of the efficiency of arbitration.243
Second, supporters argued that the FAA was necessary to speed up
dispute resolution in commercial matters. Bernheimer praised arbitration as
more expeditious than litigation.244 Arbitration would be quicker because
issues could be
decided upon motion papers, affidavits and such exhibits as the party
chooses to submit, obviating the necessity of appearance in court,
together with the calling of witnesses and the opportunity for other
preliminary motions and proceedings. The whole matter should be
disposed of within a few days after the application is made.245
Noting a three-year backlog in civil courts, supporters championed
arbitration as a mechanism to remove inter-merchant disputes from state and
federal courts, in order to reduce court congestion.246 Cohen further argued
that removing inter-merchant disputes from court dockets would free courts
to handle other cases “without waiting for a year or two for it to be reached.
In other words, you would take out all these matters of business and leave the
courts free to handle the business that ought to be handled with dispatch.”247
Herbert Hoover, as the Secretary of Commerce, urged Congress to adopt the
FAA because “[t]he clogging of our courts is such that the delays amount to
a virtual denial of justice. . . . I believe the emergency exists for prompt
action and I sincerely hope that this Congress may be able to relieve the
serious situation.”248 These arguments proved influential, as Congress
expressed concern about the timeliness of dispute resolution.249
The speed of dispute resolution was seen as particularly important in the
context of disputes involving perishable goods. W.H.H. Piatt, Chairman of

242. Id. at 31 (resolution of American Bankers’ Association).
243. See David S. Clancy & Matthew M.K. Stein, An Uninvited Guest: Class Arbitration and
the Federal Arbitration Act’s Legislative History, 63 BUS. LAW. 55, 61 (2007) (“After the 1923 and
1924 hearings, the House Judiciary Committee and the Senate Judiciary Committee each generated
a report recommending passage of the FAA. Those reports make clear that, when it enacted the
FAA, Congress understood arbitration to be something inherently prompt, inexpensive, and
streamlined—in other words, just the type of proceeding that had been described by the witnesses
during the pre-enactment hearings.”).
244. See Arbitration Hearings, supra note 238, at 5 (statement of Charles L. Bernheimer) (“But
the merchant finds that arbitration is a very direct and very expeditious method. Our courts are so
clogged that it is sometimes years before they can reach a settlement: but the arbitration makes a
prompt settlement . . . .”).
245. Joint Hearings, supra note 234, at 35–36 (statement of Julius Henry Cohen) (quoting
“brief on the proposed Federal arbitration statute,” submitted by Mr. Cohen).
246. Id. at 26 (statement of Alexander Rose, Arbitration Society of America).
247. Id. at 18 (statement of Julius Henry Cohen).
248. Id. at 21 (letter from Herbert Hoover, Secretary of Commerce).
249. See H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 2 (1924) (“It is practically appropriate that the action should
be taken at this time when there is so much agitation against the costliness and delays of litigation.”).
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the Committee on Commerce, Trade, and Commercial Law of the American
Bar Association, testified that the FAA “would offer such opportunities for
saving perishable products. A man ships a carload of potatoes in and a
creditor attaches it, and the potatoes stand there on a side track and freeze or
rot. Under the arbitration proposition he could save them.”250 Representatives of producers and shippers of vegetables and fruits testified in favor of
the bill, asserting that arbitration would benefit business and “the whole
country.”251 For example, Gray Silver, representing the American Farm
Bureau Federation, told Congress that “arbitration in commercial matters . . .
will be helpful in speeding business generally.”252
The supporters of the FAA cobbled together the above arguments to
suggest that the legislation was pro-consumer, but not because consumers
would be in arbitration themselves. Rather, consumers would benefit,
Bernheimer argued, for at least three separate reasons. First, he argued that
the high costs of litigation between merchants would necessarily be passed
on to consumers in the form of higher prices, and thus, enforcement of
arbitration clauses in commercial contracts would ultimately redound to the
benefit of consumers.253 Second, Bernheimer argued that the relative speed
of arbitration would reduce merchant costs—and ultimately consumer
prices—because the FAA “will help to conserve perishable and semiperishable food products, and save many millions of dollars in foodstuffs now
wasted because of the lack of legally binding arbitration facilities.”254 Third,
consumers would pay less in taxes to maintain state courthouses that were
busy with intra-merchant litigation.255

250. Arbitration Hearings, supra note 238, at 11 (statement of W.H.H. Piatt).
251. Joint Hearings, supra note 234, at 28–29 (statement of Henry L. Eaton).
252. Id. at 11–12 (statement of Gray Silver, American Farm Bureau Federation).
253. Id. at 7 (statement of Charles L. Bernheimer) (“The litigant’s expenses—that is, whatever
is necessary to cover the annual outlay for litigation or the fear of litigation, consultations with
lawyers, the possibility of cancellations, and so forth, eventually creeps into the selling price as well.
It is a part of the overhead of a business, and finds its reflection in the price of the articles sold, and
consequently the prices of commodities involved are correspondingly increased.”); Arbitration
Hearings, supra note 236, at 7 (statement of Charles L. Bernheimer) (“The merchants want this
very badly. It adds to the cost to the consumer if the merchant has in the calculation of his prices to
consider, in his overhead, possible litigation, possible claims. All of these expenses go into the
overhead running expenses of the business. No matter how little it is, it will have the result of
reducing the cost, without taking it out of the purchaser or anybody.”).
254. Arbitration Hearings, supra note 238, at 3 (statement of Charles L. Bernheimer); see also
Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 280 (1995) (“Congress, when enacting this
law, had the needs of consumers, as well as others, in mind.”).
255. Joint Hearings, supra note 232, at 6 (statement of Charles L. Bernheimer) (“The expense
to the State and the counties in the final analysis, comes out of taxes. Taxes are paid by the
consumer, big and little. I know there may be a difference of opinion on that subject but let me
exemplify it: In the seller’s market the seller has the advantage, and he is able to prorate his taxes
into his products. He has control. In the buyer’s market the reverse holds good.”).
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These arguments in favor of the FAA carried the day. Not a single
senator or representative voted against it.256 This is not surprising; nobody
spoke or wrote in opposition to the legislation.257
The most important fact about the testimony, hearings, and reports
leading up to congressional enactment of the FAA is that every witness, every
Senator, and every Representative discussed one issue and one issue only:
arbitration of contract disputes between merchants. Cohen spoke of “the
disposition of business in the commercial world.”258 The judicial opinions
that Cohen cited as necessitating the FAA all involved contract disputes
between businesses.259 Throughout his testimony, he described arbitration as
only between businesspeople.260 Similarly, the representative of the
American Bankers’ Association praised arbitration for linking bankers’
interests with those of “merchants and business men.”261 Wilson J. Vance,
Secretary of the New Jersey State Chamber of Commerce, praised arbitration
because “few cases . . . have come actually to trial in the arbitration tribunals
[because] business men have adopted the practice of getting together and
settling their business differences.”262 Bernheimer, too, praised arbitration
because it would “enable business men to settle their disputes expeditiously
and economically.”263 He argued that arbitration “preserves business
friendships.”264 Witnesses without contradiction described the FAA as
involving situations involving “a contract between merchants one with
another, buying and selling goods.”265 Furthermore, the New York arbitra-

256. Moses, supra note 234, at 110 (“Having been passed without a single negative vote in
either the House or the Senate, the Federal Arbitration Act was signed into law in 1925 and became
effective January 1, 1926.”).
257. Joint Hearings, supra note 234, at 24.
258. Id. at 13 (statement of Julius Henry Cohen).
259. Id. at 33 (statement of Julius Henry Cohen) (citing cases); see also Moses, supra note 234,
at 106 (“The hearings make clear that the focus of the Act was merchant-to-merchant arbitrations,
never merchant-to-consumer arbitrations. All of the examples given by Bernheimer as to cases he
knew about or cases he had personally been involved with through the New York Chamber of
Commerce were cases between merchants.”).
260. See, e.g., Joint Hearings, supra note 234, at 41 (statement of Julius Henry Cohen) (quoting
“brief on the proposed Federal arbitration statute,” submitted by Mr. Cohen) (“If business men
desire to submit their disputes to speedy and expert decision, why should they not be enabled to do
so?”).
261. Id. at 31 (statement of Thomas B. Paton, American Bankers’ Association).
262. Id. at 30–31 (statement of Wilson J. Vance, Secretary, New Jersey State Chamber of
Commerce).
263. Arbitration Hearings, supra note 236, at 2 (statement of Charles L. Bernheimer) (emphasis
added); see also Joint Hearings, supra note 232, at 6 (statement of Charles L. Bernheimer)
(describing litigation as unprofitable).
264. Joint Hearings, supra note 234, at 7 (statement of Charles L. Bernheimer).
265. Arbitration Hearings, supra note 238, at 10 (statement of W.H.H. Piatt) (emphasis added).
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tion law that served as the template for the FAA was designed for arbitration
between merchants.266
All of the examples cited of the efficacy of arbitration involved disputes
between merchants. Many involved international contracts,267 most notably
disputes between British merchants and New York merchants.268 R.S.
French—who testified as a representative of the National League of Marine
Merchants of the United States, the Western Fruit Jobbers’ Association of
America, and the International Apple Shippers’ Association of America—
noted the importance of enforceable arbitration agreements for large exporters and importers of perishable goods.269 In addition to international
disagreements, domestic business interests wanted their arbitration agreements among each other enforced. Trade organizations praised the FAA as
facilitating arbitration among merchants in the same trade.270 Cohen testified
that “one of the rules of the trade is that if you belong to a trade you shall
arbitrate your differences with them.”271
A wide range of merchant associations endorsed the FAA. These
included fruit jobbers; wholesale grocers; raisin growers; poultry, dairy, and
egg producers; peach and fig growers; canners; music publishers; and coffee,
sugar, and lumber producers.272 Beyond specific industries, chambers of
commerce of various cities, states, and territories gave their official support
to the FAA.273 One reason that merchant associations across disparate
industries supported arbitration was the perception that merchants in contract
disputes with each other would be best served by an arbiter who knew their
industry.274
266. Julius Henry Cohen, The Law of Commercial Arbitration and the New York Statute, 31
YALE L.J. 147, 148–51 (1921).
267. See, e.g., Arbitration Hearings, supra note 238, at 7 (statement of Charles L. Bernheimer)
(“The New York Steamship Co. had a dispute with a firm of shippers in Halifax on a shipment of
$17,000 worth of codfish to Para, Brazil.”).
268. Joint Hearings, supra note 234, at 8 (statement of Charles L. Bernheimer) (“We handled
in 1921 about 150 cases between British merchants and New York merchants, the result of the slump
of 1920, when every one tried his best to get out from under by putting his load on the other fellow’s
shoulders if he could.”).
269. Id. at 12 (statement of R.S. French).
270. See, e.g., id. at 13 (statement of C.G. Woodbury of the National Canners’ Association and
of the Canners’ League of California) (testifying that the Canners’ organizations supported passage
of the FAA).
271. Id. at 29 (statement of Julius Henry Cohen).
272. Id. at 21–22 (list submitted by Charles L. Bernheimer).
273. Id.
274. Id. at 27 (statement of Alexander Rose); Moses, supra note 232, at 111 (“Arbitration was
a remedy that was well-suited, according to Cohen, ‘to the disposition of the ordinary disputes
between merchants as to questions of fact—quantity, quality, time of delivery, compliance with
terms of payment, excuses for non-performance, and the like. It has a place also in the determination
of the simpler questions of law—the questions of law which arise out of these daily relations
between merchants as to the passage of title, the existence of warranties, or [related] questions of
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Most explicitly of all, when clarifying that the FAA did not reach labor
disputes, the ABA’s Piatt explained that the FAA “is purely an act to give the
merchants the right or the privilege of sitting down and agreeing with each
other as to what their damages are, if they want to do it. Now, that is all there
is in this.”275
B.

How Courts Misconstrue Legislative Intent in Arbitration Cases

Courts have repeatedly upheld both arbitration clauses and anticonsumer terms within them—as well as striking down states’ ability to
protect consumers—based on a claimed fealty to legislative intent. Despite
Supreme Court claims to the contrary, the FAA does not reflect “a
congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration
agreements.”276 Rather, this “so-called policy favoring arbitration appears to
be one created by the judiciary out of whole cloth.”277 This subpart explains
how each individual aspect of the Court’s proffered Congressional intent
behind the FAA is incorrect.
1. The Scope of Arbitration Clauses.—In passing the FAA, Congress
intended to allow arbitration for only a narrow set of legal claims: intermerchant contract disputes sounding in breach and maritime claims.278 The
Supreme Court opinions extending the FAA to cover federal statutory claims
find no support in either the text or legislative history of the Act.279 The Court
converted an absence of evidence regarding congressional intent into proof
of congressional intent.280 It is hardly surprising, however, that neither
legislators nor witnesses expressed an intent to exclude statutory claims; no
one had ever conceived that future judges would misinterpret a law written
for contract disputes to apply to federal statutory claims, which were not

law.’” (quoting Julius Henry Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA.
L. REV. 265, 281 (1926))).
275. Arbitration Hearings, supra note 238, at 9 (statement of W.H.H. Piatt) (emphasis added);
see also Moses, supra note 234, at 106 (describing Piatt’s statement as “the central concept behind
the Act: to provide for enforceability of arbitration agreements between merchants”).
276. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). The Court
provided no citation for this critical proposition. Id.
277. Moses, supra note 233, at 123 (“The 1925 Congress never indicated in the slightest way
that arbitration was to be favored over judicial resolution of disputes. It simply made arbitration of
commercial and maritime agreements enforceable in federal court because, until 1925, such
agreements had essentially been revocable at will by the parties.”).
278. Id. at 139 (“Moreover, the FAA was never described in the legislative history as applying
to any claims other than contract and maritime claims.”).
279. Id. at 138–39.
280. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625–26 (1985);
Moses, supra note 234, at 141.
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discussed at all.281 Arbitration was not intended for statutory problems, like
antitrust, but for routine commercial matters of contract interpretation,
breach, and remedy.282
Congress intended to allow arbitration for contract disputes between
merchants in the federal jurisdiction where the parties disagreed about such
facts as the trade custom applied to interpret a particular contract provision.283
Arbitrators who knew a particular trade, it was argued, were well situated to
decide such factual issues quickly. Immediately after the enactment of the
FAA, Cohen and a co-author noted that “[n]ot all questions arising out of
contracts ought to be arbitrated. It is a remedy peculiarly suited to the
disposition of the ordinary disputes between merchants as to questions of
fact—quantity, quality, time of delivery, compliance with terms of payment,
excuses for non-performance, and the like.”284
Arbitration was not intended for complex legal issues, such as those
involving statutory claims. Cohen himself noted that arbitration was “not the
proper method for deciding points of law of major importance involving
constitutional questions or policy in the application of statutes.”285 Instead,
legal questions of statutory interpretation were “better left to the determination of skilled judges with a background of legal experience and established
systems of law.”286 In short, the Supreme Court constructed a false narrative
of an expansive FAA that applied to all manner of statutory claims, when the
drafters, proponents, and enacting legislators designed a law intended only
for addressing contract disputes between merchants.
2. Consumer and Employment Contracts.—The Supreme Court has
repeatedly held that the FAA requires enforcement of arbitration clauses in
consumer contracts. The Court has invoked legislative intent to justify its
holdings. Congress, however, intended the FAA to allow enforcement only
of arbitration agreements between merchants.287 Congress did not intend the
FAA to apply to consumer contracts. The witnesses spoke only of merchants

281. Moses, supra note 234, at 139 (“Nor is there evidence that anyone at the time believed the
FAA made statutory claims arbitrable.”).
282. Cohen & Dayton, supra note 272, at 281 (“[Arbitration] is not the proper method for
deciding points of law of major importance involving . . . policy in the application of statutes.”).
283. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1759 (2011) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (citing substantial authority indicating that Congress intended arbitration to primarily
resolve disputes of fact between merchants).
284. Cohen & Dayton, supra note 272, at 281.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. See supra subpart (III)(A); see also Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20,
39 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“There is little dispute that the primary concern animating the
FAA was the perceived need by the business community to overturn the common-law rule that
denied specific enforcement of agreements to arbitrate in contracts between business entities.”).
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having arbitrators, not consumers.288 Arguments against the FAA within the
ABA—which debated and drafted the statutory language that became the
FAA—said nothing about consumer contracts.289
In particular, Congress did not intend the FAA to facilitate firms
imposing arbitration clauses on consumers through contracts of adhesion. In
the context of take-it-or-leave-it contracts between businesses, Cohen
testified that the FAA would not facilitate adhesive contracts because regulations protected the weaker merchant.290 The FAA’s advocates repeatedly
indicated that the Act would not apply to contracts of adhesion.291 For
example, in colloquy, when senators raised the issue of contracts of adhesion,
the bill’s supporters testified that the FAA would not apply to such
situations.292 Indeed, Piatt—the Chair of the ABA committee that drafted the
FAA—testified that he would oppose legislation that would allow mandatory
arbitration clauses in contracts of adhesion.293
Consumer contracts are different than the arbitration agreements that the
1925 Congress considered. The 1925 Congress assumed that it was
addressing arbitration between businesspeople who knowingly and voluntarily agreed to arbitrate.294 Supporters testified that arbitration was not
intended to replace courts and was “purely voluntary.”295 Consumer contracts are not the product of arm’s-length negotiations between parties of
relatively equal bargaining power.296 Not only are consumers denied input
into the contract terms, they are often unaware that their contracts include
mandatory arbitration provisions.297 Although modern courts assume that
consumers knew that they were waiving their right to participate in class
288. See, e.g., Arbitration Hearings, supra note 238, at 4 (statement of Charles L. Bernheimer).
289. Id. at 8 (statement of W.H.H. Piatt).
290. Joint Hearings, supra note 234, at 15 (statement of Julius Henry Cohen).
291. Moses, supra note 232, at 107 (“Cohen and his fellow supporters thus indicated that this
bill would not apply in adhesion contracts for several reasons. First, there were protections written
into law; second, protective requirements were issued by federal agencies; and third, that was simply
not the intent of the legislation, which was specifically aimed at voluntary resolution of disputes
between merchants.”).
292. Arbitration Hearings, supra note 238, at 9 (statements of Sen. Walsh of Montana and
W.H.H. Piatt) (discussing take-it-or-leave-it insurance contracts).
293. Id. at 10 (statement of W.H.H. Piatt) (“Speaking for myself, personally, I would say I
would not favor any kind of legislation that would permit the forcing a man to sign that kindof [sic]
a contract. I can see where that could be, right now.”).
294. Moses, supra note 234, at 108 (“As Representative Graham noted in the House floor
debate in 1924, ‘[t]his bill simply provides for one thing, and that is to give an opportunity to enforce
an agreement in commercial contracts and admiralty contracts—an agreement to arbitrate, when
voluntarily placed in the document by the parties to it.’”); see also Horton, supra note 228, at 447
(“[E]ven a cursory review of the FAA’s legislative history reveals that Congress did not want the
[FAA] to apply to contracts between parties with unequal bargaining power.”).
295. Joint Hearings, supra note 234, at 26 (statement of Alexander Rose).
296. Tracey & McGill, supra note 87, at 461–62.
297. Id. at 462.
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action,298 such knowledge does not generally exist in contracts of adhesion
that include arbitration clauses.299 And the Supreme Court has forbidden
states from trying to require businesses to inform consumers about arbitration
clauses in their contracts.300
In business contracts, both parties have a similar incentive to structure a
neutral arbitration process that favors neither plaintiff nor defendant because
each party bears a similar risk of being the plaintiff or the defendant.301 In
contrast, in consumer contracts, the business entity is far more likely to be
the defendant and thus has a strong incentive to design and impose an arbitration process that is anti-plaintiff. Consumers cannot prevent this because
they have no say in designing the arbitration process. Thus, not surprisingly,
the arbitration terms discussed in Part I—waiving class actions, limiting
damages, truncating statutes of limitations, precluding injunctions—are all
decidedly pro-defendant.
The Supreme Court has made the same errors that it made regarding
consumer contracts when it has considered the arbitrability of employment
contracts. When the Justices claim that Congress intended the FAA to cover
employment contracts,302 they are again misreading the legislative history.303
During the earliest hearings for the FAA, concerns were expressed that the
Act could cover employment contracts for stevedores, seamen, and railroad
workers because their occupations involved interstate and foreign commerce,
which was within the authority of Congress to regulate.304 The Act’s text was
amended to provide that “nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of
employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.”305 In addition to endorsing this

298. See, e.g., Walther v. Sovereign Bank, 872 A.2d 735, 750–51 (Md. 2005) (holding that a
“conspicuously presented” provision in an arbitration agreement waiving class action rights was
valid and enforceable).
299. See Lemley & Leslie, supra note 13, at 44–45 (discussing the imposition of arbitration
clauses on unaware consumers).
300. See infra notes 352–56 and accompanying text.
301. Supporters of antitrust arbitration assume that antitrust litigation is between merchants
who know the arbiter and are equally likely to be plaintiff or defendant; they ignore consumerinitiated antitrust litigation. E.g., Mark R. Lee, Antitrust and Commercial Arbitration: An Economic
Analysis, 62 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1, 27 (1987).
302. Samuel Estreicher, Predispute Agreements to Arbitrate Statutory Employment Claims, 72
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1344, 1363–72 (1997).
303. See id. (discussing general principles of unequal bargaining power); Horton, supra note
228, at 446–47 (explaining that Congress did not intend for the FAA to apply to “contracts between
parties with unequal bargaining power”).
304. Arbitration Hearings, supra note 238, at 9 (statements of W.H.H. Piatt and Sen. Sterling).
305. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
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explicit exception—as did Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover306—Piatt
testified that it
is not intended that this shall be an act referring to labor disputes, at
all. It is purely an act to give the merchants the right or the privilege
of sitting down and agreeing with each other as to what their damages
are, if they want to do it. Now, that is all there is in this.307
The amendment appeased labor interests, who removed their opposition to
the bill.308
The Supreme Court has misinterpreted the labor exception to the FAA.
The Supreme Court asserted that the law “exempts from the FAA only
contracts of employment of transportation workers.”309 The statutory
exception was not intended to imply that employment contracts for other
workers did fall within the FAA. Rather, if a worker was not engaged in
interstate or foreign commerce, then Congress did not consider itself to have
the authority to legislate as to the arbitrability of the worker’s employment
contract.310 As Professor Moses notes, “no one in 1925—not the drafters, the
Secretary of Commerce, organized labor, nor members of Congress—
believed that the FAA applied to employment contracts.”311 By misreading
the FAA, the Supreme Court has effectively preempted any efforts to limit
arbitration of employment contracts.312
Furthermore, employment contracts have none of the hallmarks of the
business contracts whose arbitration clauses Congress intended to make
enforceable. As with consumers, the Supreme Court mischaracterizes
workers’ submission to mandatory arbitration as “voluntary.”313 For exam306. Arbitration Hearings, supra note 238, at 14 (statement of Herbert Hoover, Secretary of
Commerce).
307. Id. at 9 (statements of W.H.H. Piatt).
308. Moses, supra note 234, at 112 n.81 (“Earlier opposition by seamen and railroad employees
had been diffused when a provision was added excluding them from coverage of the Act.”).
309. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119 (2001).
310. Id. at 136 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“When the Act was passed (and the commerce power
was closely confined) our case law indicated that the only employment relationships subject to the
commerce power were those in which workers were actually engaged in interstate commerce.”);
Moses, supra note 234, at 106 (“Under the view of the Commerce Clause at that time, the Act did
not apply to contracts of most workers. It only applied to contracts of workers actually engaged in
interstate or foreign commerce, such as seamen or railroad employees, and those workers were
specifically excluded.”).
311. Moses, supra note 234, at 147; see also Circuit City Stores, 532 U.S. at 128 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (“[N]o one interested in the enactment of the FAA ever intended or expected that § 2
would apply to employment contracts.”).
312. See Arbisser & Pollak, supra note 211, at 209 (describing multiple Supreme Court rulings
which found that the FAA preempted state supreme court decisions invalidating arbitration
agreements).
313. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 32–33 (1991) (rejecting
inequality of bargaining power between employers and employees as a reason to categorically reject
arbitration agreements in employment contracts).
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ple, the Court in Gilmer asserted that the employee—“an experienced businessman”—was not coerced into signing an arbitration agreement despite the
fact that he could not work in the industry without waiving the right to
litigate.314 In contrast to the facts of Gilmer, most of the workers whose legal
claims are blunted by arbitration clauses with class action waivers are not
“experienced businesspeople” but blue collar workers who are effectively
prevented from suing for illegal discrimination.315 By failing to appreciate
the limited reach that Congress intended for the FAA, the Justices have
“eviscerate[d] the important role played by an independent judiciary in
eradicating employment discrimination.”316
3. Deference to Unconscionable Terms.—In over a dozen opinions, the
Supreme Court has asserted—without evidence—that Congress enacted the
FAA with the intent of compelling courts to enforce arbitration clauses
“according to their terms” or “as written.”317 This “according to their terms”
language facilitates the arbitration bootstrap because firms can put anticonsumer terms in the arbitration clause and, judges reason, the FAA requires
enforcement of those terms.318 The Court has converted its judge-made
presumption of arbitrability into a presumption of contract terms being
enforceable as long as they are inserted into an arbitration clause. When
legislators in 1925 discussed the enforceability of arbitration agreements,
they limited their inquiry—and their legislation—to the issue of allowing
merchants to remove their contract disputes from federal courts to private
arbitral tribunals. Congress gave no thought to the possibility that decades
later firms would laden arbitration clauses with terms that were unconscionable, inequitable, or otherwise unenforceable under applicable state law.
The Supreme Court has claimed that Congress intended arbitration
clauses to trump “public policy” concerns of the states, such as protecting
citizens from unconscionable contract terms.319 Thus, courts have held that
precluding class action waivers would impermissibly “undermine the
FAA.”320 These policy concerns do not undermine the FAA because the Act
was never intended to apply to these situations. Congress did not intend the
FAA to make individual terms in an arbitration clause enforceable, especially

314. Id. at 33.
315. See, e.g., 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 251–53 (2009) (describing the claims
of maintenance and cleaning employees who had agreed to arbitrate discrimination claims).
316. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 42 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
317. See cases cited supra note 214.
318. See Cruz v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, 648 F.3d 1205, 1212–13 (11th Cir. 2011) (referring
to “the FAA’s objective of enforcing arbitration agreements according to their terms”).
319. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1747 (2011).
320. Coneff v. AT&T Corp., 673 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2012).
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if those terms violated state law when not incorporated into an arbitration
clause.
First, although courts invoke the legislative history of the FAA to uphold
class action waivers in arbitration clauses,321 Congress did not desire
enforcement of class action waivers embedded in arbitration clauses in
contracts of adhesion.322 Congress never considered class actions, waivers,
or the possibility that firms would manipulate the terms of arbitration clauses
in order to nullify state-law doctrines designed to protect consumers and
workers.
Congress never envisioned—or desired—the holdings of
Concepcion and its progeny because Congress intended the FAA to apply
only to inter-merchant disputes, not consumer contracts or consumerinitiated litigation.323 Thus, when courts assert that they must enforce class
action waivers in arbitration clauses lest they create “an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress,”324 they are wrong.
Second, courts incorrectly invoke congressional intent when they use
the FAA to uphold arbitration clause provisions that shorten statutes of
limitations.325 Congress expressed no such intention. Indeed, the only
apparent reference to statutes of limitations occurred when one senator
praised the fact that “most of the States have legislated . . . that no provision
in the contract shortening the time of the statute of limitations shall be
valid.”326 Neither the congressional reports, supporting documents, nor
hearing testimony ever hinted that statutes of limitations were too long or that
arbitration clauses could be used to shorten statutes of limitations. Certainly
Congress never considered firms doing so in consumer contracts. Congress
was concerned only with inter-merchant disputes; the claims of consumer
fraud and other statutory violations that consumers are forced to arbitrate are
fundamentally different than the commercial disputes that prompted
Congress to enact the FAA.
Third, when courts claim that arbitration provisions limiting damages or
injunctive relief must be enforced,327 they are misreading the legislative
history of the FAA. Congress did not intend the FAA to be a mechanism that
firms could use to limit remedies—whether damages or injunctive relief—to

321. See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
322. See Tracey & McGill, supra note 86, at 461–62 (contending that “[i]ncluding a class action
waiver in a modern-day adhesion contract raises an unconscionability ‘red flag’ that Congress
hardly could have anticipated when it adopted the FAA”).
323. See id. (explaining that “[c]onsumer arbitration agreements lack the fundamental
foundation of contractual arbitration that Congress likely anticipated: equal bargaining power”).
324. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
325. See supra subpart III(A).
326. Arbitration Hearings, supra note 238, at 10 (statement of Sen. Walsh of Montana).
327. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
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consumers and workers.328 Congress conceived of arbitration as a decisionmaking process. Supporters of the FAA championed arbitration as a more
efficient mechanism for fact-finding—especially regarding trade custom—
not as a device that defendants could use to preemptively cap their damages.
4. Preemption of State Laws to Protect Consumers.—Although courts
hold that Congress intended the FAA to prevent states from enacting laws to
protect their citizens, Congress did not intend the FAA to preempt state law.
The supporters made a point of noting that the FAA did not affect state laws
or state courts but rather “declares simply the policy of recognizing and
enforcing arbitration agreements in the Federal courts[.] [I]t does not
encroach upon the province of the individual States.”329 To accompany his
testimony to Congress, Cohen submitted a brief that declared: “There is no
disposition therefore by means of the Federal bludgeon to force an individual
State into an unwilling submission to arbitration enforcement. The statute
can not have that effect.”330 Cohen promised that the FAA would not
“infringe upon the provinces or prerogatives of the States.”331 Writing
immediately after the law’s enactment, Cohen reiterated that the FAA was a
procedural law for federal courts and that state law determined whether
arbitration agreements were enforceable in state courts.332
In addition to clear statements of intent that the FAA should apply
neither to state courts nor state laws, other contextual evidence points to the
same conclusion. First, leading up to congressional consideration of the
FAA, the ABA drafted both the FAA and the Uniform State Arbitration Act
(USAA),333 which would apply to state courts in states that adopted the
USAA. The latter would have been entirely unnecessary if the FAA had the
reach that the Supreme Court ascribed to it sixty years later. Second,
witnesses testified that they hoped that the FAA would be a model for states
to follow to enact their own legislation to make arbitration clauses

328. Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138, 154 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
329. Comm. on Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law, The United States Arbitration Law
and its Application, 11 A.B.A. J. 153, 155 (1925) (emphasis added); see also Joint Hearings, supra
note 232, at 38 (brief of Julius Henry Cohen) (“Congress rests solely upon its power to prescribe
the jurisdiction and duties of the Federal courts.”); H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1 (1924) (“The purpose
of this bill is to make valid and enforcible [sic] agreements for arbitration . . . in the Federal courts.”).
330. Joint Hearings, supra note 232, at 40 (brief of Julius Henry Cohen); see also Southland
Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 26 (1984) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“If characterizing the FAA as
procedural was not enough, the draftsmen of the Act, the House Report, and the early commentators
all flatly stated that the Act was intended to affect only federal-court proceedings.”).
331. Joint Hearings, supra note 232, at 39 (brief of Julius Henry Cohen).
332. Cohen & Dayton, supra note 272, at 275–76 (“The statute as drawn establishes a procedure
in the Federal courts . . . . It is no infringement upon the right of each State to decide for itself what
contracts shall or shall not exist under its laws.”).
333. Moses, supra note 234, at 127 n.187.
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enforceable.334 This argument makes no sense if the FAA required states to
enforce arbitration clauses, as the Southland opinion asserted. Finally, the
drafters and supporters of the FAA pronounced that “[t]he statute establishes
a procedure in the Federal courts for the enforcement of arbitration
agreements. It rests upon the constitutional provision by which Congress is
authorized to establish and control inferior Federal courts.”335 Indeed, while
some scholars have defended the Southland opinion,336 “almost all of the
commentators who have written about Southland agree that this case was
wrongly decided and inconsistent with congressional intent.”337 In short, the
FAA should not affect state legislators’ efforts to protect consumers in their
states from anti-consumer arbitration provisions.
In sum, the Supreme Court Justices did not simply misread the
legislative history of the FAA; they made it up out of whole cloth.338
Misreading would have required the Justices to review the pertinent hearings
and reports, and then to misinterpret that record. But the Justices cite nothing
from the legislative history when they assert how the 1925 Congress would
have wanted the FAA applied. This is not surprising because there is nothing
in the legislative record to indicate that Congress intended the FAA to apply
to consumer contracts or to statutory claims; nor did Congress seek to create
a federal policy that “favored” arbitration, especially a policy that prevented
states from enforcing their consumer protection laws and applying their
contract doctrines to arbitration clauses. Instead, all of the evidence from the
historical record shows that Congress either did not consider or did not intend
any of these outcomes.

334. Joint Hearings, supra note 234, at 28 (statement of Alexander Rose).
335. Comm. on Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law, supra note 326, at 154; see also id.
(“A Federal statute providing for the enforcement of arbitration agreements does relate solely to
procedure of the Federal courts.”).
336. Christopher R. Drahozal, In Defense of Southland: Reexamining the Legislative History of
the Federal Arbitration Act, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 101, 169 (2002).
337. Moses, supra note 234, at 125–26 (“To reach its decision, the Court had to virtually ignore
the legislative history that it nonetheless claimed to rely upon.”); Horton, supra note 228, at 445–
46 (“[T]he vast majority of scholars believe that Congress understood the [FAA] to be a federal
procedural rule that neither applied in state court nor preempted state law.”); see also Southland
Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 25 (1984) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“One rarely finds a legislative
history as unambiguous as the FAA’s. That history establishes conclusively that the 1925 Congress
viewed the FAA as a procedural statute, applicable only in federal courts, derived, Congress
believed, largely from the federal power to control the jurisdiction of the federal courts.”).
338. See Moses, supra note 232, at 113 (contending that, in reference to the FAA, “[t]he Court
has, step by step, built a house of cards that has almost no resemblance to the structure envisioned
by the original statute”).
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The Policy Consequences of Misconstruing the Legislative History of
the FAA

The Supreme Court’s misreading of congressional intent has created a
deeply flawed policy regarding mandatory arbitration clauses. The Courtfacilitated steady expansion of mandatory arbitration beyond the bounds
intended by Congress has served to undermine entire bodies of both federal
and state law, while leaving state legislators unable to protect their citizens.
The Supreme Court justified its expansion of the FAA’s scope to include
statutory claims by asserting that requiring plaintiffs to submit those claims
to mandatory arbitration was not tantamount to waiving their statutory
rights.339 Even if that were true at some point in the past, it no longer holds
true. With the Court’s evisceration of the Effective Vindication Doctrine in
Italian Colors, when the arbitration clause includes a class action waiver, it
is, in fact, tantamount to a prospective waiver of rights.340 Arbitration clauses
that preclude classwide procedures effectively prevent consumers from
pursuing relatively low-value claims, especially because attorneys generally
refuse to represent individual plaintiffs in such actions.341 Thus, it is not
surprising that when defendants win motions to compel arbitration, plaintiffs
generally do not arbitrate, instead letting their claims expire without
remedy.342 Even when a firm’s arbitration process can be characterized as
relatively “consumer friendly,” few consumers exercise their contractual
right to individual arbitration.343 Several courts have recognized that forcing
consumers to arbitrate individually instead of litigate effectively waives
important statutory remedies.344

339. 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 265 (2009).
340. Lemley & Leslie, supra note 13, at 11. Furthermore, in many instances, a class action
waiver can effectively prevent meaningful equitable relief because an arbiter’s injunction applies
only to the individual plaintiff, allowing a firm to continue its misconduct against other consumers.
See Schatz v. Cellco P’ship, 842 F. Supp. 2d 594, 610–11 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“This clause would
seem to prohibit the arbitrator from ordering Verizon to lower the prices being charged to a group
of customers based on the claim of an individual customer.”).
341. McKenzie Check Advance of Fla., LLC v. Betts, 112 So. 3d 1176, 1184 (Fla. 2013).
342. See CFPB ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 16, § 6.7.1, at 59–60 (“For the 46 class cases
and six individual cases in our set in which a motion to compel arbitration was granted, we reviewed
the court dockets . . . for indications of a subsequent filing in arbitration. For the 46 class cases, we
found 12 subsequent arbitration filings . . . . For all of the six federal individual cases in which the
court granted an arbitration motion, we found no evidence in the court record that a subsequent
arbitration proceeding was filed.” (footnotes omitted)).
343. See Gilles, supra note 63, at 1224 (“Despite how ‘quick [and] easy’ AT&T’s arbitration
process in the Concepcion case may have been, ‘few consumers invoked [that] process’—and one
wonders if any did. Certainly, individual arbitrations of consumer claims will have a difficult time
attracting lawyers, who will find little profit in representing a handful of small-claims clients.”
(footnotes omitted)).
344. See Crewe v. Rich Dad Educ., LLC, 884 F. Supp. 2d 60, 84 n.13 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)
(collecting cases).
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This situation is made even worse when firms employ arbitration clauses
to bootstrap all manner of anti-plaintiff terms in their contracts. Shortened
statutes of limitations reduce the likelihood of plaintiffs filing their claims in
time. Damage-limitation provisions reduce the incentive to sue and increase
the risk that even successful plaintiffs will not be fully compensated for their
proven injuries. The manipulation of fee-shifting provisions increases the
problem. Judges have asserted that two-way fee-shifting provisions encourage plaintiffs to bring suit.345 While one-way pro-plaintiff fee-shifting
statutes may have this effect, pro-defendant fee-shifting provisions can deter
plaintiffs from bringing any action,346 even a meritorious one, due to the fear
that adjudicator error could result in significant financial penalties for the
plaintiff.347 Forum-selection clauses included in arbitration provisions can
render arbitration costs prohibitive. Finally, confidentiality and related
clauses can prevent victims of mass misconduct from coordinating their
efforts to seek relief.
The Supreme Court seems unconcerned by these anti-plaintiff terms
because, the Justices assert, consumers and employees are voluntarily
agreeing to mandatory arbitration and the attendant terms. Consumers, however, are often unaware that their contracts include an arbitration clause.348
One study out of St. John’s University “found that 87% of respondents who
said that they had never entered a consumer contract with an arbitration
clause had indeed entered into at least one consumer contract that included a

345. Id. at 83–84 (“Further, the fee- and cost-shifting provision of the Agreement here gives
counsel a substantial incentive to bring a genuinely meritorious claim: It provides that ‘the
prevailing party shall be entitled to obtain all reasonable costs, including its reasonable attorney fees
at the trial and appellate levels.’”).
346. Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of AT&T
Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 645 (2012) (“[B]ounty and fee-shifting clauses are
plainly intended to avoid liability and not to select an alternative forum for the resolution of
disputes.”).
347. Albert Yoon & Tom Baker, Offer-of-Judgment Rules and Civil Litigation: An Empirical
Study of Automobile Insurance Litigation in the East, 59 VAND. L. REV. 155, 160–61 (2006) (noting
that the pro-defendant English rule may “deter[] meritorious litigation, particularly by litigants with
limited resources.”). Some courts have held that the possibility of fee shifting undermines
arguments that class action waivers are unconscionable. See, e.g., Snowden v. Checkpoint Check
Cashing, 290 F.3d 631, 638–39 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding that a class action waiver in an arbitration
clause was not unconscionable because the plaintiff could recover her attorney’s fees under the
prevailing fee-shifting statutes); Brueggemann v. NCOA Select, Inc., No. 08-80606-CIV, 2009 WL
1873651, at *3 (S.D. Fla. June 30, 2009) (“The Eleventh Circuit has held that class action waivers
in arbitration agreements are valid and enforceable, especially when the plaintiff would still be
entitled to attorney’s fees awards.”); id. (collecting cases). However, if courts enforce class action
waivers in arbitration clauses, then the “availability of attorney’s fees is illusory if it is unlikely that
counsel would be willing to undertake the representation.” Muhammad v. Cnty. Bank of Rehoboth
Beach, 912 A.2d 88, 100 (N.J. 2006).
348. Margaret L. Moses, Privatized “Justice,” 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 535, 547 (2005) (“The
courts are permitting the removal of large numbers of disputes from our system of justice into
private forums, without the consent, agreement, or knowledge of the participants.”).
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pre-dispute arbitration clause.”349 Of those consumers who claimed to look
for arbitration clauses and who claimed to never enter contracts that included
them, “85% had . . . entered at least one contract with an arbitration clause.”350
The relatively complex language employed in arbitration clauses
exacerbates the problem. The CFPB study found that in many industries,
arbitration clauses required a significantly higher level of education to
understand than the remainder of the contract.351 Even when consumers are
aware that their contracts include an arbitration clause, they do not comprehend the details. Over one-third of respondents in one study believed that
they could litigate their claims despite the presence of pre-dispute arbitration
clauses in their contracts.352 In another study, fewer than one in five
respondents recognized that a contract that included an arbitration clause
“could impact their right to a jury trial.”353 Furthermore, a majority of
consumers believed—incorrectly—that they could still participate in a class
action lawsuit.354
That mandatory arbitration is imposed on an unaware public further
magnifies the harm caused by the Court’s misreading the FAA to prevent
states from ensuring knowing waiver of the right to litigate. The Court has
claimed that states can “protect[] consumers against unfair pressure to agree
to a contract with an unwanted arbitration provision. . . . under general
contract law principles,”355 but then ignores and invalidates any state laws
designed to do so.356 The Supreme Court struck down Montana’s requirement that the first page of a contract provide notice if the contract includes
an arbitration clause because the law applies “specifically and solely [to]
contracts ‘subject to arbitration,’ [and thus] conflicts with the FAA.”357
349. CFPB ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 16, § 3.2, at 8 (citing Jeff Sovern, Elayne E.
Greenberg, Paul F. Kirgis, & Yuxiang Liu, ‘Whimsy Little Contracts” with Unexpected
Consequences: An Empirical Analysis of Consumer Understanding of Arbitration Agreements 60
(St. John’s School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 14-0009)),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2516432 [http://perma.cc/B66N-4WHV].
350. Id. § 3.2, at 8.
351. See id. § 2.4, at 28 (In market for GPR prepaid card contracts, “the arbitration clauses . . .
in most cases were written at a higher grade level (with an average Flesch-Kincaid grade level of
15.0, as compared to 11.8 for the rest of the contract) and had worse readability scores . . . .”); id.
§ 2.4, at 29 (“Storefront payday loan arbitration clauses almost always were more complex and
written at a higher grade level than the rest of the payday loan contract.”).
352. Id. § 3.1, at 3–4.
353. Id. § 3.2, at 7–8 (citing Sovern et al., supra note 347).
354. Id. § 3.1, at 3–4 (“When we asked consumers if they could participate in class action lawsuits against their credit card bank, more than half of those whose agreements had pre-dispute
arbitration clauses thought that they could participate (56.7%).”).
355. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995).
356. See, e.g., Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 446 (2006) (“[W]e
cannot accept the Florida Supreme Court’s conclusion that enforceability of the arbitration
agreement should turn on ‘Florida public policy and contract law.’”).
357. Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 683 (1996).
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Under this reasoning, states cannot require any notice regarding arbitration,
because any law requiring notice of arbitration, by definition, targets
contracts with arbitration provisions. Nothing in the legislative history of the
FAA even remotely suggests that Congress intended to interfere with state
law at all, let alone prevent states from ensuring that their citizens enter
arbitration agreements knowingly.358 In short, the Supreme Court arbitration
jurisprudence affirmatively thwarts truly consensual arbitration by
preventing consumers from being informed that they are waiving their rights
to litigate and to participate in class actions.359
By upholding arbitration clauses in contracts of adhesion and enforcing
otherwise unenforceable contract terms as long as they are inserted into
arbitration provisions, courts have dismantled the apparatus of consumer
protection in the United States. Arbitration allows firms to circumvent
mandatory rules, which are designed to protect consumers, by forcing
consumer claims into arbitration systems that may not recognize these
rules.360 After Concepcion, firms can successfully preclude both class action
litigation and class-wide arbitration.361 Qualified private attorneys are
unlikely to take cases to individual arbitration.362 Professor Sternlight has
explained that “[b]y permitting companies to use arbitration clauses to
exempt themselves from class actions, Concepcion will provide companies
with free rein to commit fraud, torts, discrimination, and other harmful acts
without fear of being sued.”363 Similarly, Public Citizen predicted that
Concepcion will cause “more hidden fees and charges on your cellphone bill,
more predatory lending, more discrimination—in short, a less just
society.”364

358. See Casarotto v. Lombardi, 886 P.2d 931, 935 (Mont. 1994), vacated sub nom. Doctor’s
Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996) (describing how Montana legislators “did not want
Montanans to waive their constitutional right of access to Montana’s courts unknowingly”).
359. See Moses, supra note 346, at 542 (critiquing the Court’s opinion in Casarotto).
360. Andrew T. Guzman, Arbitrator Liability: Reconciling Arbitration and Mandatory Rules,
49 DUKE L.J. 1279, 1285 (2000) (“[U]nder the current system, the parties to a transaction are,
indeed, able to convert mandatory laws into default laws through the use of arbitration—making the
use of arbitration to resolve issues related to mandatory laws problematic.”).
361. Gross, supra note 19, at 54 (“Academics and the media viewed AT&T Mobility as
signaling the death of class arbitration as a method to redress small dollar value claims.”).
362. J. Maria Glover, The Structural Role of Private Enforcement Mechanisms in Public Law,
53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1137, 1210 (2012) (“[I]t is inconceivable that a private attorney, who
might have sufficient expertise in consumer fraud, will have the economic incentive to root out
consumer fraud if the only economic gain to be had is through individual arbitrations. The
significant investment of resources required to identify wronged individuals and to pursue their
small claims on an individualized basis likely will not justify any eventual gains.”).
363. Sternlight, supra note 25, at 704.
364. Deepak Gupta, Congress Must Undo Damage of U.S. Supreme Court’s Latest AntiConsumer Decision, PUB. CITIZEN (May 17, 2011), http://www.citizen.org/pressroom/
pressroomredirect.cfm?ID=3346 [http://perma.cc/8DE4-M2VM].
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The claim that firms impose arbitration because it is more efficient than
litigation is disproven by examining the contents of their non-consumer and
non-employment contracts. Firms that impose mandatory arbitration clauses
in their consumer contracts do not include such terms in their contracts with
other businesses. In their empirical study, Professors Theodore Eisenberg,
Geoffrey Miller, and Emily Sherwin show for firms that impose arbitration
clauses on their customers and employees, “less than 10% of their negotiated
non-consumer, non-employment contracts included arbitration clauses.”365
The authors conclude that “companies value, even prefer, litigation as the
means for resolving disputes with peers. . . . [This] casts doubt on the
corporations’ asserted beliefs in the superior fairness and efficiency of
arbitration clauses.”366 This suggests that arbitration in consumer contracts
is designed to hurt consumers, blunt class actions, and deter consumers from
pursuing their rights.
The Supreme Court has essentially held that the contract defense of
unconscionability does not apply to arbitration because Congress wanted to
preempt anything that would hamper arbitration. But that risks eliminating
all contract defenses because whenever a contract defense is applied to a term
in an arbitration clause, it prevents the strict enforcement of the arbitration
clause and thus, in the Court’s view, hampers arbitration.
IV. Reconciling the Legislative Intent and the Practical Reality of
Arbitration Clauses
The Supreme Court’s misreading of the FAA and congressional intent
has created a legal regime in which firms can immunize themselves from
lawsuits brought by their customers and employees. A proper, comprehensive solution would require unraveling the chain of mistakes that the
Supreme Court has made regarding the FAA over the past three decades:
courts would not interpret the FAA to apply to federal statutory claims;367
courts would not use the FAA to make arbitration clauses in consumer and
employment contracts enforceable; courts would not apply the FAA to state
courts; and courts would not interpret the FAA to invalidate any state laws
designed to regulate arbitration clauses. All of these holdings are inconsistent
with the text and legislative history of the FAA. After over three decades of
misrepresenting congressional intent, the Supreme Court is unlikely to see
the error of its ways on any or all of these points.
Congress has been silent for far too long on the issue of arbitration. One
can appreciate that legislators may be reticent to respond to every Supreme
Court decision that arguably misperceives legislative intent or misapplies a

365. Eisenberg et al., supra note 14, at 876.
366. Id.
367. See Moses, supra note 232, at 144 (explaining “why arbitration of statutory rights is simply
wrong”).
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federal statute. In interpreting the FAA, however, the Supreme Court has for
decades—over the course of more than a dozen opinions—incorrectly
asserted that Congress intended to enact a national policy favoring private
arbitration over public litigation (even of federal statutory rights); that
Congress intended to prevent state legislatures from protecting their residents
from hidden, poorly written, and overreaching arbitration clauses; and that
Congress intended to prevent courts from applying the otherwise applicable
unconscionability doctrine to arbitration clauses and their terms. This series
of judicial mistakes necessitates a congressional response. For the past few
Congresses, a group of senators and representatives has introduced the
Arbitration Fairness Act (the AFA).368 As currently envisioned, the AFA
would prevent enforcement of pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate employment claims, consumer disputes (including securities claims), civil rights
claims, and alleged antitrust violations.369
While a step in the right direction, the AFA is no panacea for the
problems detailed in Parts I and II. First, the AFA is unlikely to pass in the
foreseeable future. Second, as written the AFA is a partial solution at best.
While it pares back the reach of the FAA—which the Supreme Court
improperly expanded—to reflect the intent of the 1925 Congress, the AFA
does not address all of the mistakes that the Supreme Court has made with
respect to the FAA. For example, the AFA does not restore the right of state
legislatures to require effective notice of arbitration provisions or of state
courts to apply unconscionability doctrine to the terms of an arbitration
clause.370 So long as Congress is addressing the problems created by the
Supreme Court’s arbitration jurisprudence, Congress should remedy all of
the problems, including the arbitration bootstrap and the high court’s
intrusion into state prerogatives.
Short of congressional action, lower courts can still address the problem
of the arbitration bootstrap by which firms insert unconscionable—or
otherwise unenforceable—terms into arbitration clauses in an effort to
insulate the terms from judicial invalidation. This is a relatively new front in
the battle over arbitration clauses. Lower courts can still prevent Concepcion
from being applied in an overly broad fashion that further undermines
consumer protection and employment discrimination laws.

368. E.g., Arbitration Fairness Act of 2015, S. 1133, 114th Cong. (2015); Arbitration Fairness
Act of 2013, S. 878, 113th Cong. (2013).
369. Congress has already engaged in targeted arbitration reform. For example, Congress has
barred defense contractors and subcontractors from imposing mandatory pre-dispute arbitration
clauses in their employment contracts. Weston, supra note 81, at 793 (citing Department of Defense
Appropriations Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-18, 123 Stat. 3409 (2009)).
370. Of course, such protections would be less necessary if pre-dispute arbitration agreements
were generally unenforceable, as the AFA would provide, but these state laws may still be necessary
in contract disputes between merchants. The 1925 Congress never intended the FAA to preempt
the ability of states to protect merchants where appropriate.
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Faced with an arbitration clause that contains unconscionable terms,
courts can take one of three approaches. First, courts can enforce the
arbitration clause as written, unconscionable terms and all. This approach is
the arbitration bootstrap. Second, courts can sever the unconscionable terms
and enforce the remainder of the arbitration clause. Third, courts can
conclude that so many unconscionable terms permeate the arbitration clause
that severing the terms is impractical, and consequently, the arbitration clause
as a whole is unenforceable. Each of these approaches will be discussed in
turn. This Part concludes that only the latter two options are consistent with
Congressional intent and good public policy.
A.

Bootstrap

Bootstrapping refers to firms inserting unconscionable terms into an
arbitration clause in the hopes that judicial deference to arbitration clauses
will extend to otherwise unconscionable or unenforceable terms buried
within these clauses. The Concepcion Court has seemingly laid the groundwork for firms to employ the arbitration bootstrap by forbidding California
courts from applying that state’s neutral unconscionability doctrine to
arbitration clauses. Building on Concepcion, the Italian Colors opinion
implicitly accepted the arbitration bootstrap by requiring enforcement of an
arbitration clause that contained both a class action waiver and a noncoordination provision, which combined to make any arbitration economically irrational.
Courts should recognize when arbitration clauses are being used to
bootstrap other terms into enforceability. Arbitration clauses have become
firms’ go-to mechanisms for inserting into contracts unconscionable terms
that would otherwise be unenforceable. These terms have little—and usually
nothing—to do with the arbitration process itself, whose efficiency is a
function of informality, limited discovery, and streamlined proceedings.371
Firms are essentially exploiting the following loophole created by courts:
(1) certain anti-plaintiff terms are unenforceable; (2) courts should defer to
arbitration clauses and uphold their provisions; thus, (3) anti-plaintiff terms
inserted into arbitration clauses will benefit from this judicial deference.372
Thus, businesses use the cover of an arbitration clause to impose anti-plaintiff
terms that have nothing to do with arbitration as such and, but for their
inclusion in a so-called arbitration clause, would be unenforceable.
Arbitration bootstrapping is inconsistent with the purpose of the FAA.
Before the 1980s-era push by the Supreme Court to make all claims
arbitrable, the Justices correctly noted that “the purpose of Congress in 1925
371. Id., at 787.
372. Venture Cotton Coop. v. Freeman, 435 S.W.3d 222, 232 (Tex. 2014) (“Courts should also
use care not to intrude upon arbitral jurisdiction under the guise of an unconscionability defense.”).
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was to make arbitration agreements as enforceable as other contracts, but not
more so.”373 The 1924 House Report noted that under the FAA, “[a]n
arbitration agreement is placed upon the same footing as other contracts,
where it belongs.”374 Even as the Supreme Court expanded the FAA beyond
the vision of Congress, the Justices repeatedly acknowledged that Congress
intended the FAA “to place arbitration agreements upon the same footing as
other contracts.”375 To restore equal footing, the Supreme Court would have
to recognize its incorrect assertion of a national policy favoring arbitration is
not only false, it is inconsistent with the Court’s own admission that the FAA
merely put arbitration agreements on the same footing as other contracts.376
The Court often asserts both that the FAA puts arbitration clauses on equal
footing and that the FAA favors arbitration. For example, the Concepcion
Court asserted both that the FAA requires courts to “place arbitration
agreements on an equal footing with other contracts”377 and that the Act
“embod[ies] [a] national policy favoring arbitration.”378 Yet the Court seems
blind to the inherent contradiction between these assertions, let alone to the
fact that only the former finds support in the legislative history of the FAA.
The arbitration bootstrap creates problems of unequal footing, in that
unconscionable terms are treated differently depending on whether or not
they reside in a contract with an arbitration clause. The Concepcion Court
ignored that the Discover Bank rule applied to all class action waivers and
did not treat arbitration clauses unequally.379 California was not alone. For
example, the courts of New Mexico invalidated unconscionable class action
waivers, regardless of whether the underlying contract contains an arbitration
clause.380 It would be incongruous for these courts to be blocked from

373. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 n.12 (1967).
374. H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1 (1924).
375. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991); Allied-Bruce Terminix
Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 275 (1995) (“[A] broad interpretation of this language is consistent
with the Act’s basic purpose, to put arbitration provisions on ‘the same footing’ as a contract’s other
terms.”).
376. Moses, supra note 346, at 539.
377. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011).
378. Id. at 1749 (second alteration in original) (quoting Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v.
Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006)); see also Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24, 26 (claiming both that the
FAA “place[d] arbitration agreements upon the same footing as other contracts” and created “a
healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration”).
379. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1757 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The Discover Bank rule is
consistent with the federal Act’s language. It ‘applies equally to class action litigation waivers in
contracts without arbitration agreements as it does to class arbitration waivers in contracts with such
agreements.’”); id. at 1756 (“California law sets forth certain circumstances in which ‘class action
waivers’ in any contract are unenforceable.”); Tracey & McGill, supra note 87, at 459–60.
380. Fiser v. Dell Comput. Corp., 188 P.3d 1215, 1218–19 (N.M. 2008).
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enforcing their rules so long as the waiver is buried in an arbitration clause.381
Although class action waivers remain unenforceable in many states in a
nonarbitration context,382 firms can easily employ arbitration clauses to
circumvent these state laws. Thus, “opting for arbitration, corporations can
always opt out of class actions, despite a generally applicable state-law
doctrine that would limit such opt outs.”383 This asymmetry is the antithesis
of the equal footing that the FAA requires.384
B.

Sever

Instead of facilitating the arbitration bootstrap, courts can sever
unconscionable terms and enforce the remainder of the arbitration clause.
When a contract or arbitration provision has a severability clause, it is
relatively straightforward for the courts to “strike the offending unconscionable provisions to preserve the contract’s essential term of arbitration.”385
Judges, however, have the power to sever unconscionable terms even if the
contract does not contain a severability clause.386 Both before and after
Concepcion, some courts have embraced severability as a solution to
unconscionable terms in arbitration clauses. For example, courts have
severed from arbitration clauses provisions that unconscionably shift fees,387
limit remedies,388 select an unsuitable forum,389 or shorten statutes of

381. See THI of N.M. at Hobbs Ctr., LLC v. Patton, 741 F.3d 1162, 1164 (10th Cir. 2014)
(holding that the FAA preempts New Mexico state law concerning the enforceability of compulsory
arbitration provisions).
382. See, e.g., Figueroa v. THI of N.M. at Casa Arena Blanca LLC, 306 P.3d 480, 485 (N.M.
Ct. App. 2012) (discussing New Mexico public policy concerning the unenforceability of class
action waivers).
383. Wilson, supra note 91, at 123 (“After Concepcion, class waivers may be invalidated as
unconscionable if they are in an agreement that does not have an arbitration clause, but they may
not be invalidated under the same doctrine if they are in an agreement that does have an arbitration
clause.”).
384. Id. (“This result is not consistent with the purpose of the FAA that is reflected in the text
and legislative history: eliminating judicial hostility by ensuring that arbitration agreements are
enforced on equal footing with other contracts.”); see also Ware, supra note 125, at 1026 (“If a
contract clause waiving punitive damages in court is unconscionable, then an arbitration clause
prohibiting arbitral punitive damages awards is unconscionable.”).
385. Zuver v. Airtouch Commc’ns, Inc., 103 P.3d 753, 768 (Wash. 2004); see also Long v.
BDP Int’l, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 2d 832, 846 (S.D. Tex. 2013) (“This severability provision
demonstrates the parties’ intent to sever unconscionable provisions.”).
386. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1670.5 (West 2011); Spinetti v. Serv. Corp. Int’l, 324 F.3d 212, 219
(3d Cir. 2003); 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
387. In re Checking Account Overdraft Litig., 485 F. App’x 403, 406 (11th Cir. 2012).
388. See Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 675 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that
unconscionable fee-splitting and remedies provisions could be severed).
389. See Willis v. Nationwide Debt Settlement Grp., 878 F. Supp. 2d 1208, 1221 (D. Or. 2012)
(stating that the court “may sever the forum-selection provision from the arbitration clause and
require arbitration in Oregon while enforcing the remainder of the clause”).
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limitations.390 The original drafters of the FAA believed that arbitration
clauses would be severable if found unenforceable.391
The Concepcion Court ruled against severing the class action waiver at
issue in that case. This decision was in error. The class action waiver was
unconscionable under applicable state law, which the FAA text explicitly
states should govern. The Concepcion majority asserted that striking the
class action waiver would fundamentally undermine the arbitration process,
making it less efficient and less likely to be utilized. This is incorrect because
the parties can engage in classwide arbitration. As Justice Breyer explained
in his dissent, “a single class proceeding is surely more efficient than
thousands of separate proceedings for identical claims. Thus, if speedy
resolution of disputes were all that mattered, then the Discover Bank rule
would reinforce, not obstruct, that objective of the Act.”392
Even given the Concepcion precedent, the other anti-consumer terms
embedded in arbitration clauses are sufficiently distinguishable from class
action waivers that courts can sever them without running afoul of
Concepcion. The Concepcion Court opined that state law cannot declare
contracts—including arbitration agreements—unconscionable for not providing for “judicially monitored discovery” or use of the Federal Rules of
Evidence.393 Even when state laws are facially neutral, the Court suggested
that such laws would be preempted by the FAA because these laws “would
have a disproportionate impact on arbitration agreements.”394
These “disproportionate impact” arguments do not apply to the other
anti-consumer terms that firms embed in arbitration clauses. Congress
enacted the FAA based on representations that arbitration—for intermerchant disputes—can be more efficient than traditional litigation.395 None
of the anti-consumer terms discussed in subpart I(C) enhance the efficiency
of the arbitration process. First, truncating statutes of limitations does not
make the process of arbitration efficient; it simply makes it happen sooner—
and often not at all, as victims of misconduct are less likely to file their claims
in time. Second, limiting remedies—whether it be a cap on damages or
prohibition on equitable relief—does not make dispute resolution more
efficient; it simply diminishes the likelihood that successful plaintiffs will
390. See Long, 919 F. Supp. 2d at 846 (concluding that a one-year limitation period as applied
to Fair Labor Standards Act claims is unconscionable and that severance is appropriate).
391. Cohen, supra note 264, at 156 (“[I]n the legal sense the arbitration provision is severable,
in that, though unenforceable itself, it does not avoid the rest of the contract . . . .”); see also RentA-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 70–71 (2010) (“[A]s a matter of substantive federal
arbitration law, an arbitration provision is severable from the remainder of the contract.” (quoting
Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 445 (2006))).
392. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1759–60 (2011) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
393. Id. at 1747 (majority opinion).
394. Id.
395. See supra subpart III(A).
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receive relief similar to what they could get in court. Third, provisions to
override statutory fee-shifting provisions do not aid in fact-finding or arbiter
decision making; they merely reduce the plaintiffs’ incentive to pursue
arbitration, even when plaintiffs have suffered a legal wrong. Fourth, forumselection clauses can increase inefficiencies when the designated forum is
thousands of miles away from the parties and necessary witnesses. Finally,
non-coordination clauses not only fail to enhance the efficiency of
arbitration; they are a major source of inefficiency. Such clauses significantly increase the cost of arbitration, to the point where individual arbitration is prohibitively expensive because the costs exceed the maximum award
available at arbitration. Non-coordination clauses, like other terms that are
unconscionable (in at least some jurisdictions), are neither designed nor
intended to increase the efficiency of arbitration. Rather, each of these anticonsumer terms is designed to reduce the probability of arbitration actually
happening because rational plaintiffs realize that the expected benefits of
pursuing their claims are dwarfed by the likely costs. Because attorneys
perform a similar cost–benefit analysis, these clauses also reduce the
likelihood that consumers and employees can find qualified attorneys willing
to take their cases to arbitration. Each of these terms is severable because
none go to “the conduct of arbitration itself,”396 which refers to how arbiters
manage discovery, take evidence, and run the adjudication. The appropriate
way to implement the congressional mandate of equal footing for arbitration
clauses would require courts not to give more deference to anti-consumer
terms if they reside in an arbitration clause.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court’s “disproportionate impact” rationale
creates a risk of improperly striking down consumer-protective laws that
have a disproportionate effect on anti-consumer arbitration clauses. For
example, the Ninth Circuit upheld the enforceability of an arbitration
provision that violated Montana’s rule against “adhesive agreements running
contrary to the reasonable expectations of a party.”397 The court claimed to
“take Concepcion to mean what its plain language says: Any general statelaw contract defense, based in unconscionability or otherwise, that has a
disproportionate effect on arbitration is displaced by the FAA.”398 When
courts treat neutral rules that reduce the perceived incentive to arbitrate as
necessarily disfavoring arbitration—and, thus, forbidden by the FAA—this
creates incentives for firms to structure their arbitration clauses in a manner
that makes consumer-protective rulings appear to disfavor arbitration. Firms
have tried to artificially tie arbitration clauses to their terms by including “[a]
so-called blow-up clause [that] provides that if the class action waiver ‘is

396. Clay v. N.M. Title Loans, Inc., 288 P.3d 888, 901 (N.M. Ct. App. 2012).
397. Mortensen v. Bresnan Commc’ns, LLC, 722 F.3d 1151, 1153–54 (9th Cir. 2013).
398. Id. at 1159.
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found to be unenforceable, then the entirety of [the] arbitration provision
shall be null and void.’”399 The fact that a judicial decision holding that a
class action waiver is unconscionable would, pursuant to the contract, move
any dispute from arbitration to litigation does not make the state law—or the
precipitating judicial opinion—anti-arbitration. Firms cannot hold their own
arbitration clauses hostage and then assert that failure to enforce any other—
unconscionable—terms in the clause would nullify the arbitration clause and
thus courts must enforce the unconscionable terms. Courts should not reward
such attempts to circumvent state law. Unfortunately, as it currently stands
firms may be able to use poison pills to make unconscionable terms enforceable if courts are loath to enforce neutral state laws that have the incidental
effect of nullifying a particular arbitration clause.
Severing unconscionable terms is not anti-arbitration. Some courts
seem to treat invalidation of individual anti-consumer terms as an impediment to arbitration altogether. But the process of arbitration and the terms
within the arbitration clause are separate. Provisions that shorten statutes of
limitations, limit damages, or preclude injunctive relief are not inherently part
of the agreement to arbitrate rather than bring claims in court; they are
tangential. Firms bury them in the arbitration clause because these terms are
unenforceable otherwise. There is a difference between hostility to arbitration and hostility to anti-consumer terms when they are contained within an
arbitration clause. It is not anti-arbitration to enforce a general rule that
invalidates particular contract terms regardless of whether they appear in an
arbitration clause or not.
C.

Strike

While severing an individual contract term is relatively straightforward,
severing becomes more complicated when an arbitration clause has several
unconscionable terms. Some arbitration clauses have unconscionable
provisions woven throughout them.400 In these cases, courts conclude that
“severance is inappropriate when the entire clause represents an ‘integrated
scheme to contravene public policy.’”401 Courts reason that striking an
arbitration clause down in its entirety is appropriate when “one-sided
arbitration provisions” are “central to the overall arbitration scheme and,
therefore, the unconscionable provisions could not be severed from the
arbitration provisions so as to save the parties’ general agreement to
399. Cruz v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, 648 F.3d 1205, 1207 (11th Cir. 2011); see also CFPB
ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 16, § 1.4.1, at 10, § 2.5.5, at 46 (stating that most arbitration
clauses with class prohibitions also contain an “anti-severability” provision).
400. See, e.g., Graham Oil Co. v. ARCO Prods. Co., 43 F.3d 1244, 1248–49 (9th Cir. 1994)
(explaining that a highly integrated arbitration clause contained three different illegal provisions).
401. Id. at 1249 (quoting 2 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 5.8, at
70 (1990)).
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Other courts worry that trying “to ameliorate the
arbitrate.”402
unconscionable aspects of [an] arbitration agreement would require [the]
court to assume the role of contract author rather than interpreter.”403 For
these reasons, the California Supreme Court held in Armendariz404 that—
instead of severing individual unconscionable terms—trial courts could
strike down an arbitration clause entirely when it is “‘permeated’ by
unconscionability.”405 Under the Armendariz rule, California “courts will not
sever when the ‘good cannot be separated from the bad.’”406
Some courts have questioned whether the Armendariz rule—and other
states’ versions of it—survives Concepcion.407 In Zaborowski,408 for
instance, the Ninth Circuit applied the Armendariz principles to strike down
an arbitration agreement that had five unconscionable clauses because
severing would require the district judge to “assume the role of contract
author rather than interpreter.”409 The dissent, however, argued that
Armendariz was reversed by Concepcion because “[t]he reasoning in
Armendariz that multiple unconscionable provisions will render an
arbitration agreement’s purpose unlawful has ‘a disproportionate impact on
arbitration agreements’ and should have been preempted by the Federal
Arbitration Act.”410
Common law rules that permit courts to strike unconscionable
arbitration clauses—when severability is not practical—are not preempted by
the FAA. Congress explicitly wanted judges to apply the same contract

402. Ruppelt v. Laurel Healthcare Providers, LLC, 293 P.3d 902, 909 (N.M. Ct. App. 2012).
403. Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1180 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Booker v.
Robert Half Int’l, Inc., 413 F.3d 77, 84–85 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“If illegality pervades the arbitration
agreement such that only a disintegrated fragment would remain after hacking away the
unenforceable parts, the judicial effort begins to look more like rewriting the contract than fulfilling
the intent of the parties.” (citation omitted)); Cordova v. World Fin. Corp. of N.M., 208 P.3d 901,
911 (N.M. 2009) (“[W]e must strike down the arbitration clause in its entirety to avoid a type of
judicial surgery that inevitably would remove provisions that were central to the original
mechanisms for resolving disputes between the parties.”).
404. Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000).
405. Id. at 695.
406. Abramson v. Juniper Networks, Inc., 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 422, 438 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004); see
also Alexander v. Anthony Int’l, L.P., 341 F.3d 256, 271 (3d Cir. 2003) (“The cumulative effect of
so much illegality prevents us from enforcing the arbitration agreement.”).
407. James v. Conceptus, Inc., 851 F. Supp. 2d 1020, 1032–33 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (“The general
Armendariz rule is in serious doubt following Concepcion.”); Ruhe v. Masimo Corp., No. SACV
11–00734, 2011 WL 4442790, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2011) (“Although the Northern District of
California has indicated that some portion of Armendariz has been abrogated by Concepcion, it did
not clarify what portion of Armendariz was abrogated.”).
408. Zaborowski v. MHN Gov’t Servs., Inc., 601 F. App’x 461 (9th Cir. 2014).
409. Id. at 464 (quoting Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1180 (9th Cir. 2003)).
410. Id. (Gould, J., dissenting) (quoting AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740,
1747 (2011)).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2775437

LESLIE.TOPRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

11/25/2015 1:59 PM

The Arbitration Bootstrap

329

doctrines to arbitration clauses that they applied to other contracts.411 Courts
have interpreted Supreme Court precedent to hold that “[s]pecial state rules
for interpreting arbitration agreements cannot coexist with the FAA because
Congress intended the act as its response to a ‘longstanding judicial hostility
to arbitration agreements.’”412 Striking down an arbitration clause that is
overburdened with nonseverable unconscionable terms is not a “special rule”
for arbitration clauses; it is an application of basic contract law principles that
permit judges to refuse to enforce contracts—or contract clauses—that
contain unconscionable terms.413
Finally, it is good public policy to strike arbitration clauses in their
entirety when they contain multiple unconscionable terms. If the unconscionable terms cannot be effectively severed, courts can either strike the
arbitration clause or enforce it as written, unconscionable terms and all. If
courts are prohibited from striking arbitration clauses entirely, then firms
have a greater incentive to weave multiple unconscionable terms throughout
the arbitration provisions in order to make severing too difficult. If a firm so
burdens its arbitration clause with unconscionable terms that the unenforceable terms cannot be severed in a fashion that leaves behind a functioning
arbitration provision, the firm should not be rewarded.414 Ironically, if a court
does not have the power to strike a clause permeated with unconscionable
terms, then the more individually unenforceable terms that the firm puts in
its arbitration clause, the more likely the unconscionable terms will be
enforced. Allowing unconscionable arbitration clauses to be struck provides
better incentives to firms to not intentionally insert unconscionable terms
throughout their arbitration agreements.415
Conclusion
When courts enforce anti-plaintiff terms in arbitration clauses, they
claim to be honoring the will of the 1925 Congress that enacted the FAA.
Such assertions are wrong for several related reasons. First, the 1925
Congress did not intend the FAA to reach statutory rights. Second, Congress
did not intend the FAA to apply to consumer contracts. Third, Congress did
not intend arbitration clauses in contracts of adhesion to be enforceable.
411. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (arbitration agreements enforceable except “upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract”).
412. Venture Cotton Coop. v. Freeman, 435 S.W.3d 222, 227 (Tex. 2014) (quoting Green Tree
Fin. Corp.–Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 89 (2000)).
413. 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
414. See Graham Oil Co. v. ARCO Prods. Co., 43 F.3d 1244, 1249 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Our
decision to strike the entire clause rests in part upon the fact that the offensive provisions clearly
represent an attempt by ARCO to achieve through arbitration what Congress has expressly
forbidden.”).
415. See Booker v. Robert Half Int’l, Inc., 413 F.3d 77, 84–85 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“[T]he more
the employer overreaches, the less likely a court will be able to sever the provisions and enforce the
clause . . . .”).
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Fourth, Congress did not intend arbitration clauses to serve as vehicles for
non-negotiable terms that systematically undermine the rights and remedies
of plaintiffs, including plaintiffs’ ability to meaningfully enforce their rights.
We now have a legal regime completely at odds with the modest goal that
Congress did intend: to make agreements between merchants to arbitrate in
order to resolve commercial disputes enforceable. Instead we have a legal
system where courts are complicit in allowing firms to effectively prevent
consumers and workers from protecting their rights.
If a contract term would not be enforceable if it were outside of an
arbitration clause, it should not become enforceable because it is inserted into
an arbitration clause. Unenforceable terms should remain unenforceable
regardless of where they appear in a contract. Courts must cut the arbitration
bootstrap. If a state contract rule applies to all contracts, that rule should
apply equally to the contents of arbitration clauses. If courts stopped treating
arbitration clauses as a legitimate vehicle for anti-consumer terms, businesses
would probably stop doing so as well.
In order to implement the will of Congress, courts should either sever
the unconscionable terms in an arbitration clause—or strike the arbitration
clause altogether—so long as this is what the court would do when
confronted with the same unconscionable terms in a contract without an
arbitration clause.
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